Genetic Social Psychology: A once and future discipline

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Abstract

The 21st century beyond the imminent threat of climate change has led humanity to changes that saw increasing inequalities, and more internal fragmentation, wars and suffering within and between various societies. Various group based identities and representations have been mobilised for collective struggles to fight off historical animosities, marginalisation, exclusion and inequalities on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, ethnic, linguistic, regional or country divisions. Elections in the USA, the Brexit Referendum and the COVID-19 pandemic have also made clear that the circulation of fake news, alternative truths and manipulated propaganda as well as an increasing anti-intellectualism is becoming not only a threat to democracy but also a threat to life itself.

All these developments lead to the conclusion that both social and developmental psychology need to rethink their purpose and whether they are up to the task to contribute in any way to a holistic understanding of changing representations and identities that are at the basis of the collective problems currently faced by humanity. I claim in this chapter that this can be done through an understanding of human development as the development of the ‘social psychological subject’ (Duveen & Psaltis, 2008) and his/her representations and identities. This chapter answers to the call of the late Gerard Duveen to construct a theory that captures the dynamics of societal change and to his last paper’s call (Duveen, 2008) to return to the study of heterogeneity in social psychology by moving away from an understanding of social identity as that which holds groups together and toward the study of distinct communicative forms and social organisations.

Such an understanding takes us back to Willem Doise’s (1986) dictum that we need to understand social phenomena by articulating four different levels of analysis (intrapersonal, Interpersonal,
Inter-group, social representations/ideological). I will argue that such an articulation can only be achieved through a change orientated understanding of the interlocking processes of microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis of social representations (Lloyd and Duveen, 1990) through the extension of the theoretical framework of *Genetic Social Psychology*, which follows the key insights of late Gerard Duveen and our joint work in Cambridge (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; 2007; Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis, 2005). This will be done by critically extending Piaget’s social psychology, Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory, Serge Moscovici’s theories of Social Representations and Genetic Model of Social Influence as well as the work of Social Genevans (Doise, Mugny & Perret-Clermont, 1976). I will argue that the work of Lucien Goldmann (1954, 1955, 1964, 1969) here is crucial in offering a broader theoretical, epistemological and methodological framework for understanding some basic questions that Gerard Duveen was struggling with throughout his academic career that stem from western Marxist thought and discussions around genesis and structure (Wartkofsky, 1982).

This is a line of theoretical work with important parallels in its developments with the three generations of post-Vygotskian research in the CHAT tradition but as I will also argue it covers one of its main theoretical weaknesses, namely the handling of asymmetries and social inequalities. This absence was already there from the early beginnings of this tradition in Vygotsky’s own work.

I will take as a case study the deeply divided society of Cyprus, along ethnic lines, and the struggles for its reunification or partition to explore the processes of microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis of social representations of otherness and the Cyprus problem in various research samples from both communities covering childhood to old age in the historical time of 2003-2021, starting with the opening of checkpoints in the UN Patrolled Buffer Zone in Cyprus. As it will become clear both continuity and change of the system of values, ideas and practices about otherness can be observed and is largely regulated by adherence to social representations of the past/history, past and present intergroup contact and realistic and symbolic threats. The role of peers, family, mass media and politics in the context of a geopolitical conflict of interests will be discussed in the presentation of the case study.
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This chapter is structured in three parts. In the first part I discuss the philosophical and theoretical foundations of Genetic Social Psychology. I also return to the work of sociologist Lucien Goldmann to broaden the theoretical and methodological purview of Genetic Social Psychology. In the second part I attempt a microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic analysis of the social representations of the Cyprus issue and “otherness” with special emphasis on an understanding of how children in the two communities of Cyprus become politically socialised into a frozen conflict of a deeply divided society through the educational system. Given my interest in ontogenetic changes I review work covering childhood, adolescence and adulthood in relation to the development of prejudice and representations of the Cyprus problem and point to some of the weaknesses in mainstream social developmental theories in capturing the socio-culturally situated nature of the development of prejudice. I discuss the articulation of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes by interweaving together findings across ages in different historical points (2003-2021) and offer an autobiographical account of my changing representations of the Cyprus problem and the other community. In the third and final part of the chapter I proceed with some further theoretical reflections on the basis of the empirical evidence presented and I also respond to some critiques by other researchers interested in the development of a social developmental psychology in the footsteps of Piaget, Moscovici and Duveen.

PART I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Genetic Social Psychology: A once and future discipline

Although the term genetic as a method of scientific study has a long history that can be traced back well before the 20th century in the work of Goethe (see Wagoner, in press) the direct predecessors of the theoretical framework being developed here can be found in Jean Piaget’s Genetic Epistemology, Lucien Goldmann’s Genetic Structuralism, Serge Moscovici’s Genetic Model of Social Influence and more recently Gerard Duveen, who was working towards a Genetic Social Psychology until his untimely loss in 2008. In all of these thinkers there is a common thread that binds them together. It is the grasp of the totality of an object of study through an investigation of its development through time. This dialectic of genesis and structure, and part-whole relations refers directly to some of the more fundamental epistemological questions that not only classical
philosophy engaged with but also the modern philosophy of Kant, Hegel and Marx. This is also a theoretical framework that can help psychology out of what Vasliner (2013) described as its deep crisis, caused by its success in amassing large quantities of empirical evidence while rarely addressing the question “what for?”.

Indeed, the value of such accumulation of empirical evidence for the generalizing power of science is specifically questioned by Vasliner (2013, p.ix), who highlights the life work of the late Gerard Duveen as “a good illustration of what kind of scholarship could bring psychology out of its crisis of limited generalization value” and explicitly describes Duveen’s life project of *Genetic Social Psychology* as “the idea that will live”; hence the optimistic and future oriented title of this chapter.

**Philosophical and psychological ancestors**

From an epistemological point of view one can go back to Kant to get a clear sense of the limits of human knowledge because of its constructed nature through both sensations and deductive thinking. However, for Kant sensations are worked on and given form by the *a priori* categories (space, time etc) and in that sense these categories themselves were not constructed but given. True dialectical thinking, as argued by Lucien Goldmann (1959, 1967, 1969), can only be found in the more sociological and historical thinking of Hegel and Marx, who offer the tools to understand the socially constructed nature of these categories themselves. Moving from Philosophy to Psychology the elaboration of this dynamic and transformative view of genesis and structure is later taken on by Piaget, Vygotsky, Moscovici, and Duveen. Genesis is a Greek word (*γεννησις*) meaning the process of being born. In that sense, it refers to the beginning of something new. But of course nothing is completely new; new structures are built on old structures and in that sense there is also continuity. As pointed out by Piaget, there is no genesis without structure and no structure without genesis. The main research interest then becomes the study of how structure A transforms into structure B.

In the psychological field Vygotsky (1962; 1978) dealt with a similar problem of the emergence of higher psychological functions and scientific concepts but his formula of the general genetic law of cultural development—the Janet-Vygotsky law according to Vasliner (2000, p. 40)—was somewhat different to Piaget’s. Vygotsky proposed a clearer directional sociogenetic view compared to Piaget’s interactivist view. Whilst Vygotsky’s emphasis was on mediation by signs and sign systems, in the case of Piaget knowledge was built through the subject’s action on objects.
The internalisation formula offered by Vygotsky from social speech to thought was “too good to be true” according to Moscovici and according to Duveen it failed to grasp the mediating role of identity. One can add to this the strange omission of a role for inequalities of power in this formula which was a rather strange omission for a Marxist scholar.

There is an open debate about how Marxist Vygotsky really was (Kozulin, 1990; Moscovici, 1996; Elhammoumi, 2002; Sève, 2018) but what has become clear by now is that there is a western reading of Vygotsky that attempted to sanitize Vygotsky from Marx so that his writings could be more easily accepted in the west, during the cold-war era. Piaget also fell victim to an individualist reading of his work, especially in his reception in the USA (Hsueh, 2009). These kinds of processes of sociogenetic transformation of a theory in their reception in a new context, is easily rendered intelligible through a reading of Moscovici’s (1976/2008 second part of his book on psychoanalysis, where he describes the way the new “fruit” of the scientific theory of psychoanalysis is domesticated by different interest groups and ideologies (liberal press, church and the communist party) in the French society in the last part of the fifties.

In fact, it can be shown that both Piaget and Vygotsky proposed a thoroughly dialectical theory, where logic and consciousness emerges from the activity of the psychological subject in his/her social and historical environment. However, the universalist overtones of Piaget’s theory relegate the role of socio-cultural variations to a secondary role of acceleration or deceleration of cognitive and moral development through a single path from sensorimotor, through pre-operational and operational to formal operational thinking. Thinking gradually becomes less and less dependent on content as later structures emerge through reflection on the psychological actions of the subject toward the object, rather than the object itself. At the same time, it is clear from reading Piaget’s *Psychogenesis* (Garcia & Piaget, 1989) that these structures are not historical givens (e.g. mathematics) but are also the result of historical evolution. Vygotsky’s cultural historical theory, strongly influenced by Marxist theory, lays less universalist claims but is rather weak in formulating the role of social relations in human development. This is something rather unexpected from a Marxist (see Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014) and recognised as one of the weakest points of Vygotskian theorising by Marxist psychologists and philosophers also (Seve, 2018; Wartkofsky, 1982). It requires rectification in future efforts to build psychology’s own capital (Elhammoumi,
Despite developments of the post Vygotskian tradition in the three generations of CHAT (Engerstrom, 2008) that expanded the purview of our understanding of human development as embedded in interacting activity systems, this theoretical expansion clearly failed to capitalise on the strong epistemological foundations of Piaget’s theory as well as the theorisation of the role of social relations of power asymmetries in these activity systems.

For Piaget, the genetic process of the transformation of structure A to structure B entails a process of disequilibrium and re-equilibration of cognitive structures. Equilibrium is the idea that makes possible the synthesis between genesis and structure. In a discussion that took place in symposium on the 26th of July 1959 on Genesis and Structure with Derrida, Goldmann, Gadillac (Gadillac et al., 1959), Piaget gave the example of transition from pre-operational to operational thinking on the conservation of mass, suggesting that conflict of centrations (focusing on only one aspect of a situation at one time) on different dimensions of the clay (length, thickness) under transformation is the reason for transition from structure A to structure B. As rightly pointed by Duveen (2002), this is one of the weakest parts of Piaget’s theory and the reason for is that it carries too much of an idealist-Hegelian overtone of consciousness being in a position to fix its own inconsistencies by reflection within the same structures of a self-regulated system (that is conflicting cognitive schemes resolving their inconsistencies within the cognitive system). However, in the same discussion, Piaget importantly makes a clear linkage between equilibrated structures and the agency of the child. Piaget’s own words are instructive here:

“The equilibrium thus defined is not something passive, but on the contrary something mostly active. It takes an activity that is all the greater as the balance is greater. It is very difficult to maintain a balance of mental point of view. The moral balance of a person presupposes a strength of character to resist disturbances, to preserve values we care about, etc. Balance here is synonymous with activity.” [Piaget (1959), in Cadillac et al (1959)].

Knowing Piaget’s social psychology and methodology in clinical interviews, one would expect to see some linkage between the capacity to resist adult’s countersuggestion and its cultivation through relations of co-operation, but Piaget does not make this link in his example here.
Such a link could relate to Piaget’s distaste for authorities, ideologies or institutions imposing their views on people and the negative implications stemming from relations of constraint for both the cognitive and moral development of the person. The weakness seen by Duveen in Piaget here is created from the hesitation of Piaget to create a closer link between his relations of co-operation and equilibration as a process of co-construction with others and not simply an autoregulation of one’s own structures. This is one of the manifestations of the “social” occupying an unstable element in Piaget’s thinking (see Duveen & Psaltis, 2008). There is an interplay between self-regulation and other-regulation that Piaget’s interest in the epistemic subject did not allow empirically investigating. The linkage can be rendered intelligible by the embedding of the epistemic subject in group life and a network of social interactions, where the positions held by an individual for an object are intertwined with the representations of the other and self in the *subject-object-other* triad in both symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships.

Importantly, any genetic theory needs, from an epistemological point of view, to be able to distinguish between surface and depth knowledge. In the Marxist tradition (although Marx never elaborated any epistemological framework himself) the Proletariat are those who act on objects and consciousness is formed by action in the world. This is why the Piagetian notion is compatible with Marxism, and one can see here why Goldmann was so keen on pointing out the similarities between Piagetian Genetic Epistemology and Marxism in various occasions (Goldmann, 1956, 1976; Zimmerman, 1978). Ultimate knowledge of seemingly hidden realities, essences behind appearances such as Kant’s elusive “thing-in-itself,” was given only to those who had fabricated that reality (in the way an artist can understand the work he or she has created). Only they could overcome the analytic contradiction of surface and depth dialectically. This distinction between depth and surface knowledge is crucial in Piaget, proposed as a distinction between empirical and reflective abstraction. It is also found in his distinction between relations of constraint and relations of co-operation, where he relates forms of knowing with different qualities of social relations. It is again later found in Moscovici’s (1976) dual genetic model of social influence, as well as in the work of social Genevans (Doise, Mugny & Perret-Clermont, 1976; Doise & Mugny, 1986) who discussed about two ways of resolving socio-cognitive conflict (epistemic/constructivist vs relational), further deepening the original insights of Piaget (1932) in his *Moral Judgment of the child* in this direction.
In the work of other genetic theorists, more sociologically and critically minded than Piaget like Lucien Goldmann’s humanist marxism, Moscovici and the Social Genevans (Doise, Mugny & Perret-Clermont) the consequences of symmetrical or asymmetrical forms of social relations on consciousness also became the target of empirical study. The social Genevan’s made a distinction between two ways of resolving socio-cognitive conflict (relational regulation-that looked like conformity which did not lead to real cognitive change vs epistemic regulation which looked like the reconstruction of knowledge in Piagetian terms towards more equilibrated structures).

Lucien Goldmann’s influences from Lukacs were important in helping him formulate an understanding of how the subject-other relationship could be downgraded into a subject-object relation through processes of Objectification, Reification, or Alienation. Similar ideas can be found in the field of the study of intergroup relations today with Dehumanisation or Infrahumanisation where out-group members in an antagonistic context often lead in forms of non-recognition of others as thinking subjects or in even worst cases (linked to genocidal tendencies) denigrating them to non-humans.

This strong sense of a dual process of social influence is again found more recently in the work of Gerard Duveen, who was convinced that there are two opposing ways in which representations change. In viewing social representations theory as a genetic theory, Duveen & Lloyd (1990) argue that a genetic perspective is implied in the conception of social representations, in the sense that the structure of any particular social representation is a construction and thus the outcome of some developmental process. Three types of transformations, associated with social representation as a process, are proposed: There is the process of sociogenesis, which concerns the construction and transformation of the social representations of social groups about specific objects; ontogenesis, which concerns the development of individuals in relation to social representations; and microgenesis, which concerns the evocation and (re)construction of social representations in social interaction.
Since 2000, under the supervision of Gerard Duveen we began to explore the role of social interaction in learning and cognitive development in the educational context. This work in epistemological terms could be described as moving from the study of the epistemic subject in Piaget towards the study of the social psychological subject (Moscovici, Jovchelovitch, & Wagoner, 2013). This work was later extended in the University of Cyprus as one strand of the “third generation of research in peer interaction and cognitive development” (Leman & Duveen, 1999; Psaltis, 2005a; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006,2007; Psaltis, Duveen & Perret-Clermont, 2009; Psaltis & Zapiti, 2014; Duveen & Psaltis, 2008; Psaltis, 2011, 2012a,b). In this chapter it will be further extended into a study of the articulation of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes through the study of intergroup relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the period from 2003 to 2021 (Psaltis, 2015), which is a second line of research that we have been working on since 2006.

In the first line of research, we observed peer interaction in the educational context of collaborative problem solving. These social interactive processes were connected to the socio cultural and historical context of social representations of gender, whilst retaining the strengths of a structural analysis of Piagetian constructivism. This series of studies explored the interplay of representations and identities through the articulation of intra-personal with interpersonal, inter-group and ideological/social representational dynamics (Doise, 1986, Perret-Clermont, 1980), building both on Piagetian insights into the role of social relations in cognitive development (Piaget, 1932), the functionalist-structuralist reading of Piaget and his social psychology (Kitchener, 2002; 2009;2014), together with the empirical work of the social Genevans on peer interaction and cognitive development (Doise, Mugny & Perret-Clermont, 1975; Perret-Clermont, 1980).

Having already explored the contours of a model of transition from pre-operational to operational thought in children through the study of varying forms of communication, such processes could be expanded to a more general model of the role of social relations and communicative forms (Duveen, 2002; cf. Castorina, 2010; Leman, 2010; Jovchelovitch, 2010) in the transition from
representations of belief to representations of knowledge\(^1\) in the public sphere (see Duveen, 2008; Moscovici, 1998/2000) and sociogenetic processes (Wagner, 1994). One field of research that affords the exploration of sociogenetic processes in historical time is that of conflict transformation in societies and changing representations of conflict and its roots. In this sense the Cypriot context of a divided and post-conflict society is an ideal setting for the expansion of these ideas to an exploration of sociogenetic processes.

In our first line of research we did not have the opportunity to study sociogenetic processes. We instead concentrated on the links between microgenesis and ontogenesis in childhood, exploring the interplay between social representations of gender and the co-construction of new knowledge around cognitive Piagetian tasks in 6-7 and 9-10 year of age. The lack of emphasis on sociogenetic processes in our first line of research left us open to a critique raised by Nicolopoulou & Weintraub (2009), that the third generation of research in peer interaction and cognitive development did not yet offer a comprehensive sociocultural framework for the study of human development. In what follows, we aim at opening a window to the study of sociogenetic processes through the study of longer term changes that take place in historical time in the field of prejudice reduction through social interaction in the form of intergroup contact.

Thus, more recent work in our Genetic Social Psychology Lab at the University if Cyprus, has as its main aim the articulation of the three processes of genesis (microgenesis, ontogenesis, sociogenesis). The topic of interest (intergroup contact between the two communities in Cyprus) was initiated at the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict in 2005 but the theoretical articulation offered below is a direct continuation of the work in Cambridge. It explores the role of social interaction in the reduction of prejudice based on Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis and its recent developments. Here, we have been exploring the effects of social interaction (termed intergroup contact in the field) between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the reduction of prejudice and promotion of trust at different ages (Psaltis, 2012a; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Psaltis, Schmid, Popan, Cairns, & Hughes, 2010). More recently we have also embarked on

\(^1\) Moscovici’s (1998/2000, p.136) distinction is between a) social representations ‘‘whose kernel consists of beliefs which are generally more homogenous, affective, impermeable to experience or contradiction, and leave little scope for individual variations’’ and b) social representations founded on knowledge ‘‘which are more fluid, pragmatic, amenable to the proof of success or failure, and leave a certain latitude to language, experience, and even to the critical faculties of individuals’’ clearly relates back to his social influence model of minority influence and through that to Piaget’s (1932; 1967/1995) social psychological model of relations of constraint vs relations of co-operation.
interdisciplinary work with history educators and historians exploring the interplay between representations of history and contact theory (Psaltis, 2012a; Psaltis, Lytra & Costache, 2011; Lytra & Psaltis, 2011) as well as deepening the exploration of the internal heterogeneity of social identity positions within conflicting societies as they produce and represent cultural artefacts valorised as symbols (Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou & Vrachimis, 2014) or structure their oral historical accounts about life in formerly mixed villages in Cyprus (Psaltis, Cabrera, Lytra, Filippou, Cakal & Makriyianni, 2014; Kende, Psaltis, Cakal, Fousiani & Green, in press).

Engagement with the issue of ethnic conflict made more imperative the theoretical understanding of processes of power and the political dimension of party politics, especially as they relate to sociogenetic changes in the social representations of the Cyprus issue when attempting an understanding of sociogenetic changes in the period since the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. In this sense, the articulations between Doise’s Intergroup and Ideological Level of analysis concern not only Intergroup relations between the two communities in Cyprus but also Intra-group political processes, policies and ideologies relating to the valorisation of bicommunal relations and the solution of the Cyprus problem. This has also led us to interdisciplinary work with political scientists and sociologists (Psaltis, Loizides, Stefanovic & Cakal, 2020) exploring the views of the internally displaced in the two communities as well as policy implications of our work for the negotiation of a settlement of the Cyprus issue and decision making processes on a referendum for the solution of the Cyprus issue (Loizides et al, in press).

In theoretical terms, the theoretical and methodological sociological insights of Lucien Goldman in this extension of the theory is crucial. Not only because he applied Piagetian insights to sociological theorizing and was a great inspiration for Gerard Duveen, but also because his sociological outlook brings to our attention the significant structures that constrain the agency of the individual as he/she is embedded in the transindividual subject (dyads, groups, social classes) and the understanding of social relationships more generally and not only relations of production.
Lucien Goldmann’s Genetic Structuralism

Goldmann criticised Marxist interpretations that reduced explanations of societal consciousness to the economy and relations of production. In fact he had the crucial insight that the predominance of relations of production is only a recent symptom of late capitalism through processes of reification and that we should be seeing such relations of production only as a sub-component of social relations in general that have always been at the centre of the production of societal consciousness in the history of humanity. This is a politically crucial insight because it suggests that any social critique that will concentrate only on relations of production would be playing into the field of capitalism and not really succeeding in offering a truly critical theory that would manage to transform society at its core. Similarly, Serge Moscovici emphasised the importance for social psychological theorising beyond the monopoly of social class to the study of the relations between various minorities in the context of the conflict with dominant ideologies and views. This broadening of view beyond the narrow focus on social class calls for an understanding of intergroup relations, asymmetries of power and phenomena that have been at the epicentre of study in social psychology after WW2. We find the same broadening of the study of social relations in the work of Gerard Duveen where he explored beyond the ontogenesis of the representations of social relations of production and the economy as well as friendships and gender. In all of these works his emphasis was on the transition from pre-operational to operational understandings of social relationships. One of the main problems caused by asymmetrical social relations is that of reification as shown by Lukacs and later by Goldmann (1967). Thus a critique of the situation we are currently living in should be performed through an analysis of how reification (in its various forms) works in the formation of consciousness.

According to Petrovic (1991) reification in the Marxists tradition is

“the act (or result of the act) of transforming human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations and actions of man-produced things which have become independent (and which are imagined as originally independent) of man and govern his life. Also transformation of human beings into thing-like beings which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world. Reification is a ‘special’ case of
alienation, its most radical and widespread form characteristic of modern capitalist society” (p.463)

These are not the only possible subject-object distortions. Both anthropologists and Jean Piaget identified different mentalities in ontogenetic and historical lines of development. One characteristic form of mentality is the one described by Levy-Bruhl as participation and in Piaget as magical thinking. In this connection the link between magical thinking and existential anxieties is clear. Non differentiation between subject and object is a specific structure that serves a specific function of soothing down existential anxieties. This totality between structure and function was central in both Piaget’s and Goldmann’s genetic theorizing. Egocentric thinking was one of the manifestations of subject-object non differentiation and the difficulties in overcoming egocentrism in Piaget related to asymmetrical relations of constraint, whilst on the contrary relations of co-operation (based on mutual respect) help overcome egocentrism through decentration. Duveen (2002) also suggested that ‘belief’ is a certain form of understanding that is sustained by relations of constraint. On the contrary, ‘knowledge’ (a more flexible and less rigid form of understanding) is sustained by relations of co-operation. In his studies of the ontogenesis of representations of friendship, economy and gender (see Duveen’s essays in Moscovici, Jovchelovitch & Wagoner, 2013) he identified a number of structural differences between two orientations that broadly overlapped with Piaget’s stages of pre-operational and operational thinking.

For example, in friendships he identified an action-oriented understanding in younger children and a conceptual understanding in older children. In terms of time, younger children were trapped in the here and now: a friend was he or she who was playing with them. In the older children there was differentiation of time with friendships attaining a history and a move of knowledge from the “periphery to the centre” which entailed a more complex understanding of the subjective characteristics of friends (traits, characteristics) and a better understanding of their intentions thus differentiating action from its meaning.

Duveen also believed that the genetic study of the development of representations should entail the effort to articulate Doise’s (1986) four levels of analysis. He criticised social cognition paradigm for only exploring the intra-personal level of analysis. In his work on friendships it was clear that he suggested both the study of the subjective understandings of social relations by children but also an understanding of the possible structures of social relationships in social
interaction. He considered this dual emphasis necessary because of the lack of a clear endpoint of development that was there for Piaget in his effort to understand the development of scientific thinking but could not be established in the case of the understanding social relations causing a methodological recursivity problem. This was also done by Piaget (1923) himself in his early work on types of conversation in his first book on thought and language but also suggested as the key to understanding society as comprised of various forms of social relations and the rules of their transformations (Piaget, 1995). In my own work with Duveen (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006; 2007) we moved further in this direction by identifying varying forms of conversation types that we related with various forms of social recognition and cognitive change, in an effort to typify these forms of social interaction and articulate all four levels of analysis suggested by Doise (1986).

As I will show later, the original work of Piaget and Weil (1951) offers a broad framework for synthesising many of the theories and empirical findings about the development of prejudice in childhood and for understanding the totality of interethnic relations and consciousness beyond the narrow focus of prejudice and prejudice reduction that has become mainstream (see relevant critique by Dixon & Levine, 2012). The use of the iceberg metaphor, employed by Duveen and Lloyd (1990) and Daniel Bar-Tal in the context of interethnic conflict in Israel, is useful here: We are not only interested in the tip of the iceberg, which is attitudes or prejudice but the greater submerged part of the iceberg that is comprised by values, ideas and practices (threats, stereotypes, identifications, perspective taking, trust, representations of the past) of a group or the transindividual subject in Goldmann’s terms that sustains positive or negative emotions towards an outgroup (the tip of the iceberg).

**Actual and Potential Consciousness: Utopias, Imagination, Hope and Historical Consciousness**

To return back to Goldmann and his theorising of totality, one of the most important insights was his distinction between actual and potential consciousness. Actual consciousness refers to the consciousness of the transindividual subject (e.g., groups, classes etc) which is structured and reflects the everyday worldview of a group. In contrast, potential consciousness is captured by an articulated philosophy, ideology, work of art of literature that crystallises in the most clear way possible the structural part-whole relations of the worldview of the transindividual subject. In that sense it could be argued that potential consciousness is an orientation towards an ideal worldview according to this collectivity. In terms of social representations theory we could say that the actual
consciousness is expressed in the messy and polyphasic, sometimes inconsistent everyday practices of individuals as an expression of values and ideas that is context dependent, whilst in sociological or social psychological analyses or works of art or literature the potential consciousness is expressed in its clearest way as a structured abstraction of those values ideas and practices and a clear consistent and coherent worldview. For example, in previous work (Psaltis, 2012) we identified three positions in the representational field of the Cyprus problem in each community. The data for this analysis were collected in 2007. Ten years later in 2017 there was a transformation in the actual consciousness both in terms of the strengthening or weakening of some of these positions and the emergence of a new one marginal or hidden for the time being in public debate, which is pro-partition in the representational field of the GC community not yet crystallised in art or literature from within. However, it has been recognised as such in academic work as related to education (Psaltis, 2017) and as a position related to a corrupted political elite that profits on the continuation of partition around the Greek Cypriot leadership (Ioannou, 2020). Generally speaking, these ideological positions in the representational field or significant structures identified by our analysis (Psaltis, 2012) form a certain structure of historical consciousness that thus links past, present and future.

Historical consciousness is a concept that deals with people’s understanding of the relation between the past, the present, and the future and it has become central recently in history as a discipline and researchers from across the world deploy the concept in a variety of approaches to history didactical research (Thorp, 2014). Historical consciousness is becoming influential in policy making too. In Sweden, the Netherlands and a number of states of the German Federation for instance (Grever & Adriaansen, 2019), the history curricula states that the primary aim of teaching history in schools is to develop the historical consciousness of pupils, since it influences their identities and conceptions of morality. However, this field of study has rarely made links to the literature discussed here. Indirectly one could retract some theoretical links in the work of Rüsen (2004) who theorizes about the way narrations of history exhibit different forms of historical consciousness through different uses of history that can be placed on a developmental ladder. First, a traditional narration makes use of history to maintain or uphold tradition. Second, an exemplary narration uses history to generate rules of conduct so that history teaches us how to lead our lives. Third, the critical narration uses the historical example to criticize historical and contemporary societies and cultures. Finally, the genetic narration uses history to explain continuity and change
in historical and contemporary societies and cultures. One can easily recognize in Rüsen’s theorizing the links with Piaget’s social psychology and by extension that the two lower levels of historical consciousness (traditional and exemplary) are forms of reification where human constructions (historical narratives) come to dominate the life of the person and where the past dominates the present, forming a relation of constraint with the representation of the past in the dominant role. On the contrary, the two higher forms, the critical and the exemplary free the person from the constraints of the past either by a critical stance on hegemonic narratives or a better grasp of both continuity and change. Thus one could see how the two higher forms of historical consciousness directly relate to future utopias and the hope (Leshem, 2017; 2019) for a better future, whilst the former two are past oriented and conservative in which the past becomes sacred filled with nationalist symbols and heroes (Psaltis et al, 2014) and a rising sense of collective threat and existential anxieties through the cultivation of collective victimhood (Smeekes, McKeown & Psaltis, 2017; Psaltis, 2016). In that way positions in the representational field include in themselves the seed of either conservation or change in sociogenetic processes. The motor of change is the process of microgenesis in social interaction, and in the case of ethnic conflict and its conflict transformation it takes the form of Intergroup contact (Allport, 1954).

**Intergroup Contact as a Microgenetic process**

The origins of the idea of microgenesis can be traced in the German Context of the 1920’s and 1930’s with the work on Aktualgenese by Sander, Krueger and Werner (Psaltis, 2015; Catan, 1986; Valsiner & Van Der Veer, 2000; Wagoner, 2009). Werner was actually the first to use the term “microgenesis” in the English language in 1956 as an approximate translation of the German term Aktualgenese although the concept, as a method informed his work since the 1920’s (Catan, 1986). For Werner microgenesis refered to “any human activity such as perceiving, thinking, acting etc. as an unfolding process, and this unfolding or ‘microgenesis’ whether it takes seconds or hours or days occurs in developmental sequence.” (Werner, 1956, p.347). In his 1926 book *The Comparative Psychology of Mental Development*, he presented the microgenetic method as a way of uniting the contents and methods of experimental and developmental psychology as a means of overcoming the dualism between Experimental Psychology and Volkerpsychology promoted by Wundt. Werner was interested in formulating general developmental laws that would apply to phenomena on all developmental levels (e.g., ontogenesis, ethnogenesis).
Closer to the theoretical model developed here, the microgenetic process is the evocation of social representations in social interaction as well as the process of socio-cognitive conflict of perspectives which emerges in social interaction that creates a rupture in the taken for granted and introduces doubt (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Duveen, 2002) in the thinking or consciousness of the individual. The way of resolving this socio-cognitive conflict (superficial conformity or reconstructive coordination of perspectives) is of crucial importance as it might or might not lead to change depending on the elaboration of this conflict. Thus the motor of any change in the transindividual subject (subject-other-object triad), the significant structure of Goldmann can be thought of as the result of microgenesis. This is the changing triad that comprises the basic epistemological unit of analysis in the social constructivist framework of genetic social psychology.

People communicate in social interaction and thus social representations are evoked through the social identities asserted in the activity of individuals. A process of negotiation and (re)construction of both social representations and identities is also taking place in social interaction. From the genetic point of view, microgenesis thus holds a privileged and central position as it is the motor for ontogenesis and sociogenesis of social representations (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). Microgenesis is defined as “the genetic process in all social interaction in which particular social identities and the social representations on which they are based are elaborated and negotiated.” (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990. p.8).

As shown in our previous work with Gerard Duveen such configurations create asymmetrical expectations of control. In that sense the triad metaphor (Zittoun et al., 2007) is not a symmetrical but an asymmetrical triad imbued with power relations. In this triad any discussion about an object of representation is a socio-cognitive process implicating co-ordinations of actions and operations by both subject and other as well as pragmatic moves (through the use of words, gestures and actions) that position the psychological subject vis a vis the other. Thus in the subject-object-triad social interactive microgenetic moments are moments of potential change of all three points in the triangle as well as their relationship. This position is always suggestive of forms of social recognition and in our past work we have identified recognition of the other as a thinking subject but also instrumental recognition (Psaltis & Duveen, 2007; Psaltis, 2005). These forms of recognition regulate the participation and engagement of subject and other in less or more
symmetrical social relationships as originally described by Piaget (1932) as social relations of constraint (asymmetrical-based on unilateral respect) and relations of co-operation (symmetrical-based on mutual respect). In our work exploring the effects of intergroup contact on prejudice reduction, trust building and political positions on a compromise solution when measuring the quality of contact we have always included measurements directly related to the notion of relations of co-operation as positive quality of contact (“when meeting with a member of the other community I feel that this is based on mutual respect”) to facilitate theoretical links between our two lines of research.

The definition by Duveen & Lloyd (1990) is focused on change as a form of construction through socio-cognitive conflict in social interaction but it is unique as it implicates in this process social identity and social representations as they are enacted. According to this perspective, the evocation of social representations in social interaction occurs in the ways in which individuals construct an understanding of the situation and position themselves and their interlocutors as social subjects in the field of social representations. This process can run smoothly along the lines of the “taken for granted” but it can also lead to ruptures (see Zittoun, Gillespie, Duveen, Ivinson & Psaltis, 2003). The opening of the checkpoints in 2003 in Cyprus was exactly such a rupture point as we will see that made possible a different form of microgenetic processes taking not only the usual form of intra-group social interaction but making possible intergroup social interactions.

In this sense, generativity of social representations is premised on similarity and difference. But at the same time, microgenesis of a social representation implies reorganization towards a holistic structure with a certain coherence since the basic function of social representations is to make the unfamiliar familiar. Such processes of microgenesis can take the form of intra-group social interaction but also the form of inter-group contact and they are shaped by sociogenetic processes of public and mass mediated communication within and across groups (Wagner, 1994). In this paper we are mostly interested with this articulation of microgenesis with ontogenesis and sociogenesis in childhood at different levels of analysis (Psaltis, 2015) as they relate to the representation of the Cyprus issue.
Ontogenesis of prejudice and the role of the educational system: The narrow view of prejudice development theories

Ontogenesis is the process of change of the representations of a single individual through their life course. This process is influenced by microgenetic processes but also by the cognitive developmental level of the individual, the influence of norms, the changing role of relations of constraint and relations of co-operation beyond any maturational or biological factors.

Various theories exist that attempt to explain the development of prejudice in childhood (Aboud, 1988; Nesdale, 2004; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005) and they have all contributed a lot to our understanding of how prejudice develops from early childhood to adolescence. Nevertheless, the narrow focus of these models on prejudice fails to explore what lies beyond the tip of the iceberg in the representations of an interethnic problem as mentioned earlier. Additionally, there is an intricate tension between the developing potential of the human mind to grasp complexity and societal pressures to think in a certain direction that has not been totally understood until today. The genetic social psychological framework can contribute in capturing some of this complexity in a way that it goes beyond just the measurement of prejudice indices.

Developmental theories of prejudice

Most prejudice development theory and research has concentrated on the childhood years (4–12 years of age) with a particular focus on the role of social-cognitive developmental (Aboud, 1988) and motivational processes (Nesdale et al., 2003; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

According to Doyle and Aboud (1995), who have been influenced by Piaget’s work on children’s cognitive development, feelings of prejudice and biased attitudes in children, peak at the age of 5-7 and then decline as they grew up. Aboud and Amato, (2001) claim that the emergence of cognitive abilities during the concrete operational stage, such as the cognitive ability of conservation, or multiple classification skills, relates to the reduction of prejudice. In particular, over the age of 7, the greater attribution of importance to individual traits and characteristics rather than collective ones when assessing other individuals allows children to start recognizing that both in-group and out-group members can have both positive and negative traits. This more flexible way of thinking is less stereotypical, thus leading to a gradual reduction of prejudice in late childhood.
On the contrary the motivational Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT) (Nesdale, 2004) predicts that children before 6-7 years of age usually exhibit only in-group favoritism without out-group derogation. Prejudice can emerge after this age but its emergence depends first on the extent to which children identify with their social group, second on whether prejudice is a norm held by the members of the child's social group, and/or third on whether the in-group members believe that their group is threatened in some way by members of the out-group.

A meta-analysis (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011) shed more light on the issue of the developmental trajectory of prejudice. It included 121 cross-sectional and seven longitudinal studies of 18 different countries and examined age differences in racial, national, and ethnic prejudice from childhood to late adolescence. They found that there was a significant mean level increase in prejudiced attitudes from early to middle childhood thus supporting Aboud's (1998; 2003) proposition. However, this was only true for prejudice towards low status groups. In the case of prejudice towards national outgroups and high status groups this was not the case. This shows that there is indeed a cognitive developmental shift around the age 6-8 that makes possible the reduction of prejudice, as suggested by Aboud, but only if the social context gives messages about the inappropriateness of the marginalization of minorities. They also found evidence of more heterogeneity in prejudiced attitudes in adolescence suggesting that the role of the socio-cultural context and environmental factors becomes more central. More recent research supports the same conclusion (Barret & Oppenheimer, 2011; Miklikowska, 2017; Miklikowska, Thijs & Hjerm, 2019), especially in post-conflict settings where social identity in adolescence gains a prominent role in the context of ethnic antagonisms (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Teichman, 2017).

Such findings are in line with the Genetic Social Psychology framework in that the thought of children in early childhood would easily be expressed in simple binary oppositions as shown in the work of Duveen for the case of gender and in our previous work. It is also clear that the social representations of each group (ethnic, national, racial etc) would carry their own meanings and norms that would be expected to create varied prejudice developmental paths through social influence in microgenetic processes.

Nevertheless, what all these theoretical frameworks failed to capture is to offer an understanding of the role of the quality of social relations (both intra group and intergroup) in the development of prejudice as originally proposed by Jean Piaget (1932) and also to explore more generally the
representations about “otherness” which of course incorporates a richer set of meanings than the narrow focus on prejudice. The core question then that should be studied is the following: *How do children interact with significant in-group others (parents, peers, teachers) about otherness and how do they interact and represent otherness itself*. Both processes could be seen as different facets of the process of social representing the “other”. Whether children often find themselves embedded in social relations of constraint or co-operation (Piaget, 1932) would be expected to make a difference, but more difference in prejudice levels would be made by the content of what they discuss, mediated by cultural artefacts and symbolic resources (Zittoun et al. 2003); even more impactful would be direct intergroup contact experiences with otherness, especially if what is usually being discussed in in-group discussions with significant others carries negative overtones or geographical separation like Cyprus which offers little opportunities for intergroup contact.

But from our perspective the effectiveness of intergroup contact would also depend on children’s developmental level. It would be wrong for example to expect children in the pre-operational level who have not yet mastered part-whole relations to generalize any positive intergroup encounters from the single case to all members of the outgroup. Indeed recent reviews of the role of intergroup contact in prejudice reduction in childhood points towards this direction (Aboud & Brown, 2013).

In this connection, relevant to our focus on interethnic relations and the development of social representations of the Cyprus issue in Cyprus is the notion of sociocentrism which Piaget talks about but only once explored in any detail in his work with Weil (Piaget & Weil, 1951) on the ontogenesis of the idea of homeland in children. Despite the fact that Piaget’s work was written 70 years ago, it is more nuanced in capturing links between form and content than recent work and could perfectly explain the findings of recent meta-analyses (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011) attempting to understand the development of prejudice in childhood in many ways since it offers a more holistic understanding of representations than the narrow focus of prejudice reduction.

First, it explains why one should not expect high correlations (but small) between intelligence and prejudice levels. This is because prejudice can be sustained by various and diverse forms of thinking and some cognitive developmental skills allow an understanding of part-whole relationships that will not be necessarily inclusive of all outgroups, but in a selective manner depending on the context. Second, it suggests that both cognitive structuring and the content of the representations of the group (positive or negative) can influence prejudice in childhood and he
essentially supports the idea that both prejudiced and non-prejudiced views could be sustained by ingroup norms in late childhood and early adolescence. However, with every developing stage their application would concern a wider group (or one could talk of an expanding ethical horizon): First, there is the here and now of the egocentric child, then the possibility of submission to family or decentration from family views and values, and finally comes the submission or emancipation through reciprocity and decentration from wider societal views and values. The hallmark of deep and not superficial tolerant views for Piaget would be the development of reciprocity in thinking and not mere conformity to wider societal views that could either happen to be positive or negative.

Such an interest in the role of social relations in the development of prejudice was earlier found in the context of western Marxism in the work of Adorno. He suggested that punitive and strict parenting would lead to the formation of the authoritarian personality. Such parenting in Piagetian terms would be characterized by relations of constraint as they lack the element of mutual respect and put the psychological subject in a position of passivity in relation to others (interpersonal orientation) or the group (part-whole relations). In the later work of Altemeyer (1998) there were indeed significant relations between harsh parenting and prejudice (albeit low which is expected as I will explain later on). More recently John Duckit (2001) following the steps of Altemeyer made further distinctions within the idea of authoritarianism where in his dual model he distinguishes between an orientation of submission, likening it with social conformity, and an orientation of domination, likening it with Machiavellian ways of thinking about weaker others. He also brings convincing empirical evidence that the first orientation is related to the development of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and the second with Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) that both predict prejudice but through different paths. Interestingly, he finds that in younger adolescents the link between RWA and SDO is less strong but as adolescents become more politically socialized in later adolescence and especially in socio-cultural contexts of strong left-right wing differentiation the links become stronger and stronger.

However, I believe any rigid disjunction between the submission and domination should be resisted in both childhood and earlier adolescence as it was done in the original work of Adorno that was presented as a dual orientation that takes the one form when facing weaker and the other when facing a stronger or more prestigious group. For example, behavior shift from submission to domination and vice versa depending on who the “other” is at a given time, depending on whether
it is a low or high-status group member. The trap here from a personality theory perspective would be to essentialize an inherently situational behavior into a stable personality characteristic. And of course the methodology of measuring personality characteristics in the hyper-generalised form of “Am usually like that…” does not help in capturing the situational nature of our behaviour. This is also another reason we should not expect high correlations between relations of constraint and relations of co-operation with prejudice. Both are enacted in different situations, some more often than others. The second reason relates to the fact that both positive and negative content relating to an outgroup could be promoted by a powerful institution or people in authority. In the case of conformity pressures towards a positive anti-discriminatory policy the normative context of the in-group could be leading to prejudice reduction. This, from the perspective of genetic social psychology would not entail the reconstruction of knowledge about the outgroup but it might be enough to reduce the expression of prejudice.

The role of ingroup norms in prejudice reduction has been recently explored in the context of Social Identity Development theory (Nesdale, 2011) and a series of studies indicates that in group norms in childhood have a powerful influence on the expression of prejudice by children but they have not really examined how deep the change is as a result of normative influences. The influence of ingroup peer norms also becomes bigger in late childhood and early adolescence compared to adult in group norms that influence children more in early childhood (Aboud & Brown, 2016). However, findings about ingroup norms also show some interesting competing effects from group norms from smaller and larger groupings (e.g., friend’s group vs school norms) with norms of larger groups being in a better position to influence older compared to younger children. This of course brings to the picture the “ethical horizon” of the group which could expand with age and greater opportunities for intergroup contact (Allport, 1954) outside the smaller interpersonal bubble of the student.

**Developing agency and its role**
Agency is discussed by Gillespie (2012) as the development of the ability for distancing oneself from the immediate situation. Gillespie gives the example of the research subject in Milgram’s experiment that resists the directives of an authority to harm another individual as a good example of agency. In this sense resistance to authorities and group norms would be another example of the exercise of agency as also suggested by Piaget (1932). But how does agency develop? Gillespie (2012) shows this process to be dependent on the process of position exchange that allows the
integration of 1st and 3rd order perspectives. Agency entails identification with another person’s pain in Milgram’s experiment and taking the perspective of others on self as someone who is causing pain (thus the self becomes the observable from another perspective). In this connection it is interesting that Nesdale reports some findings that the influence of negative ingroup norms of 5-12 year olds were not moderated by empathy. Thus one could hypothesise here that as relations of constraint lose their grip on children and relations of co-operation with various others become stronger (enhanced agency) we could expect to see positive ingroup norms activating a deeper process of change (as long as they are based on relations of co-operation and not constraint) and the phenomenon of resistance becoming more likely to increase with age. However, the development of agency is not a one-way path. It depends on the sociocultural context and the values promoted by various institutions. For example, in Cyprus in the PhD thesis of Eleni Kotzamani (2021), who studied the representations of childhood and children’s rights in Cyprus, it was clear from the circulars of the Christian Orthodox church sent to schools by the Archbishop that there was minimal agency extended to students thorough a patronising attitude that allowed children to take initiatives only to the extent that they satisfied the aims of the church to cultivate religious subjects or willing participants in the collective struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from Turkish occupation. And although most 16 year old students would resist any effort by the family, church or state to impose on them organised nationalist or religious rituals there was about 20% of the sample that had internalised a position of social conformity and who had no problem whatsoever with the curtailment of their rights as far as the national cause or religion was served. This position of social conformity as predicted by John Duckit was related in a sample of both 16 year old students and their educators with a conservative view of childhood relating to diminished agency, higher religiosity, realistic and symbolic threats as well as patriotism and nationalism.

The microgenetic processes that strengthen this world view are obviously asymmetrical relations of constraint (unilateral respect). This relates to forms of recognition in microgenetic processes that we have identified as the defining element of the quality of social relations. One the one hand there is Recognition as a thinking subject (Psaltis & Duveen, 2007) which is agency promoting for the subject being recognised. On the other hand, there is instrumental recognition which downgrades the subject to an object that serves the aims of another person (usually powerful) or institution. In our previous work we have identified conversation types that facilitated the establishment of a social relation of co-operation in the form of “explicit recognition” which was
the type of conversation that entailed mutual respect (Psaltis & Duveen, 2007). On the contrary, the conversation type of no resistance (passivity) relates to relations of constraint and instrumental recognition.

Indeed, our recent work in Kyriakides & Psaltis (2020) in children between 7-17 year old Greek Cypriot students has verified links between prejudice and social relations of constraint and cooperation of significant others (peers, family and teachers) in the interpersonal sphere in middle childhood, but not adolescence and additionally the increasing influence of both positive and negative norms in the expression of prejudice in early and late adolescence. The other interesting finding from this research is the emergence of resistance in early adolescence against positive norms which is moderated by the strength of subgroup identification. Early adolescents who have very high level of identification with the Greek Cypriot identity are not influenced by positive ingroup norms but negative norms. In contrast, in middle childhood when the role of interpersonal relations of constraint and co-operation play a stronger role in predicting prejudice subgroup identification moderates the link in the opposite direction by enhancing the role of positive ingroup norms in predicting prejudice reduction. As would be predicted by Piaget and Weil (1951) older children start pertaining to ideals and political views or even worldviews that free themselves from the here and now. In the case of Greek Cypriots, due to the Hellenocentric orientation of the education system they create imaginary fraternal links with Greeks and Greece or some even see Cyprus as part of wider Hellenism. However, given the ideological baggage of this “imagined community” (Anderson,1991) that Cyprus is Greek, resistance emerges in accepting normative suggestions to be friendly towards Turkish Cypriots in the context of relationships with the other community of Cyprus and their strength of identification as simply Cypriot diminishes through their educational career in the public school (see Appendix, Table D the findings of Kyriakides, 2020).

It could be hypothesised that as children develop from childhood to adolescence relations at the interpersonal level of social constraint will diminish and relations of co-operation will increase as their agency develops. However, the actual content of the representations they are surrounded by will be mediated by ingroup norms in this transition the role of intergroup contact will be crucial as it can define the limits of their ethical horizon beyond any cognitive developmental effect of widening of perspectives. The role of semiotic means like the content of various symbolic
resources (history textbooks, films, etc) and school rituals in the orientation of the widening ethical horizon that could take a more Cypriot centric or Helleno Centric orientation in the case of Greek Cypriots and Cypriot centric or Turko centric orientation in Turkish Cypriots is also crucial. For example sixth formers in the Greek Cypriot educational system devote many hours of history teaching on the greatness of the Vyzantium and also on the Greek revolution against the Ottoman empire in a way that is suggestive of Greek Cypriots being part of this greater wholes. The mastery of part whole relationships and multiple classification is in fact a prerequisite of an understanding of these more complex part whole relationships. Dual identities also become more comprehensible. For example in the research by Chara Makriyianni 9-10 year olds had difficulty understanding what a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot is. Most often, definitions were “people born in Cyprus but who came from Greece” or speak Greek for Greek Cypriots and people who live in Cyprus but came from Turkey or speak Turkish or Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriot children have a difficulty understanding when exactly Turkish Cypriots came to Cyprus. Some mistake Turkish Cypriots with Turkish people from mainland Turkey that came after 1974 in Cyprus, called settlers by the RoC, which is expected given that are never taught anything about the history of the Turkish Cypriot community except some cursory mentions of the “rebellion” of Turkish Cypriots in 1963-1964 who did not accept the “just” claims of president Makarios to change the constitution that was not functioning and gave Turkish Cypriots “over-privileges”. This kind of content is usually taught in late adolescence (Lyceum) just before male students get prepared to enlist themselves for military service.

From Marios Kyriakides PhD thesis we have some important empirical evidence about the importance of the transition period of 10-11 years old. This is the same age that Jean Piaget identified as the transition to formal operational thinking. On the one hand, less and less children around this age act trapped from the immediate situation and adults directions. Similarly, more and more children doubt authority and challenge authority strengthening relations of co-operation. This might actually suggest that influence from parents and teachers becomes less pronounced but influence from peers becomes more important. Also, individual intergroup experiences would be expected to become a more significant source of information compared to earlier years. Indeed, this was verified by Kyriakides (2020) who found that the effects of contact in the period of 10-14 where more pronounced compared to younger children and older adolescents. In another recent research by Hjerm, Eger & Danell (2018) a longitudinal study of two cohorts 13 and 16 year olds
that was followed for 5 consecutive years in Sweden showed that the mean level of prejudice in peer groups in both ages predicts their later individual prejudice levels. Also popular students at the centre of social networks were found to be less influenced themselves by prejudice having lower prejudice. Similar effects of parental attitudes were found. Interestingly, political discussions (irrespective of the content of the discussions) were also found to have a prejudice reduction effect. This suggests that beyond the importance of the content there is also an important role played by the type of social interaction enacted if they take the form of skills in democratic processes of open dialogue. This again would be predicted by Piaget in his idea of social relations of co-operation (open dialogue where all views can be expressed, and new knowledge can be synthesized). The role of the formation of historical consciousness as discussed earlier is also crucial and in contexts of protracted conflict the misuse of history by politicians and the state is a well-known phenomenon that goes hand in hand with the political socialisation in the educational system (Psaltis, Carretero & Cehajic-Clancy, 2017).

Prejudice in Contexts of Intractable Conflict and the role of political socialisation

Perhaps, one of the most important and complicated contexts for the study of the development of prejudice is in countries where ethnic conflicts are either protracted or frozen. Coleman et al., (2014), maintain that intractable conflicts are characterized by their persistence, a history of failed attempts to resolve the conflict and their centrality in the lives of the communities involved in the conflict influencing all aspects of social life like media, cultural production, films, school, and family and peer context (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Moreover, they add that intractable conflicts have tremendous negative consequences concerning the social and economic aspects of group life (see Coleman, 2000; Deutsch, 1973). Beyond this, it is generally accepted that in countries where intractable conflict is taking place such as Cyprus and Middle East, the development of prejudice with increasing age is more and more influenced by political socialization. According to Nasie et al., (2015) political socialization is described as the ensemble of activities occurring in social setting, contributing thus to the emergence of social representations and beliefs concerning political issues. Moreover, they claim that teenagers political beliefs and opinions are considerably affected by significant others (parents, educators and peers) (Raabe & Bellmann, 2011).

Microgenetic and ontogenetic changes in prejudice are thus embedded or canalized by institutional structures, material and symbolic resources in a process of overdetermination of meaning (Valsiner, 2000) that we call sociogenetic processes. In the case of the Greek Cypriot community
this overdetermination of meaning revolves around the cultural trauma of 1974 (Roudometof & Christou, 2011), primarily through the educational policies of the ministry of education.

**Embedding Ontogenetic into Sociogenetic Processes**

Moscovici (1990) suggested that the research strategy to understand more complex representations from the study of less simple could be done either ontogenetically (Piaget and Vygotsky’s way) or by a comparison of the representations of various groups (which he called Bartlett’s way). He clearly states that he chose to do the second, although he understands the need of both for a more integrated social developmental psychology. The work of Bartlett (1932) on remembering is directly relevant to this discussion, since in the case of post-conflict and divided societies like Cyprus the past weights on the present and future of the island through the collective memory of cultural traumas in the two communities.

Bartlett studied the reconstructive nature of memory in its social context (Wagoner, 2017). Whilst he agreed with sociologists like Durkheim and Halbwachs on the social nature of memory, he disagreed with them that the group itself has memories (Wagoner, 2015), hence avoiding sociological holism. His approach is compatible with the call of Moscovici for a Genetic Social Psychology (1972; 1990), where the individual is not lost in the group but where individuality and agency itself is a function of the social relationships of the subject in the subject-object-other triad. Moscovici’s idea of making the unfamiliar and unfamiliarity itself familiar and objectification relates directly to Bartlett’s process of conventionalisation where representations get transformed as they pass from one group to another in a way that they converge with the values and orientations of the group they encounter. Described as such the study of intergroup contact could be reinterpreted through Bartlett’s work: the broader process of the sociogenesis of social representations can be articulated to broaden our view beyond mainstream theorising about the role of intergroup contact in prejudice reduction (Allport, 1954). This would be aligned with a methodological suggestion of Lucien Goldmann to follow the study of totality of the phenomenon which would entail not only the study of the accompanying beliefs, ideas and practices that support the prejudicial beliefs of children but also the study of the historical change of the same structures.

In the context of Cyprus this suggests the need for an understanding of the societal meaning of contact itself and especially how it opens up or closes opportunities for the flow of ideas between the two groups in Cyprus as a function of positions in the representational field that pivot around
interpretations of the past wars. The opportunities and outcomes of intergroup contact will be regulated and modulated by the “prospect” of the group. In social representational terms used by Bauer & Gaskell (1999) it will depend on the representational project of the group and in the terminology of Goldmann each position in the representational field as a significant structure of a group which expresses an actual and objective possibility.

From this perspective it is important to understand the historical evolution of these positions that are expected to be influenced by significant material changes (e.g. the opening of the checkpoints in 2003), changes in the media landscape, the educational system and educational reforms and processes of communication in social media (propaganda, propagation, diffusion) (Avraamidou & Psaltis, 2020). As we have seen earlier individuals can take a more or less agentic position with regards to the discourse expressed by these various institutions. Some teachers, parents and peers would repeat uncritically most of the expressions heard on the news or read in their echo chambers of FB or Twitter. In the Greek Cypriot community there were a few periods since 2003 where most of the people expressed negative feelings towards TCs (2005-2010) and other times when they were positive (2015-2017) (see Appendix 1) as in times where the leaders of the two communities exhibited willingness to negotiate in good faith to resolve the Cyprus problem made public appearances together and publicly showed trust to each other. In such a short period of time it is of course hard to believe that such a big portion of the population reconstructed their points of view. A more likely candidate is to attribute the change to a change of norms that mostly reduced people’s readiness to express prejudiced views during this period. Long term changes are however also noticeable (Yucel & Psaltis, 2020a, b) and mostly have to do with continuing contact and an increasing number of people from both communities that established intergroup friendships, a condition that according to Pettigrew satisfies the optimal conditions of intergroup contact. For example, by 2020 about 50% of TCs and 30% of GCs stated that they had at least one friend from the other community.

In short, from our genetic social psychological point of view there are two types of changes: a) changes that would take time to be effected through qualitative intergroup contact and would lead to an ideological conversion through processes described by Moscovici as cognitive validation in his theory of minority influence and b) more superficial changes especially for individuals high in social conformity and authoritarianism that could be just momentarily going with the flow
through normative influences and can be described as conformity or compliance through processes of social comparison in Moscovici’s (1984) terms. The work of Moscovici (1960) in the second part of his book on psychoanalysis, where he introduces the communicative processes of propaganda, diffusion and propagation are also relevant here, especially his use of ‘semantic barriers’ to the change of representations as it evokes the microgenetic processes of resistance to change (Psaltis, 2005).

Following the methodological suggestions of genetic structuralism, a crucial step of any scientific social analysis is the insertion of a phenomenon into a structured whole of which it is a part and where it has a function. In this case ontogenetic processes need to be understood in the context of institutional practices and activities that are there before children enter the educational system and will probably continue to be there in one form or another when they leave. In the case of education they relate to management and re-production of cultural traumas (1974 for GCs and 1963-64 for TCs) and cultivate a certain historical consciousness. Goldmann describes the way that we as researchers should understand sociogenetic changes in the following way:

“This we learn from [this knowledge] about men who, in different circumstances and with different means for the most part inapplicable in our own time, fought for values and ideals which were similar, identical, or opposed to those of today; and this makes us conscious of belonging to a totality which transcends us, which we support in the present and which men who come after us will continue to support in the future.” (Goldmann, 1969, p. 29).

In the case of nationalist education however the relationship with the past cultivated is not usually the case described above. In Rusen’s (2004) terms this would be narration in the genetic type of historical consciousness. The traditional and the exemplary, or what David Lowenthal described as Heritage, is actually more appropriate in most of the cases as the relationship to the past promoted in the public schools of Cyprus.

Thus, whilst genetic social psychology as a method promotes a genetic historical consciousness it should be in a position to identify different significant structures that entertain varying forms of historical consciousness. In the work of Goldmann for example he had identified romanticism, empiricism, rationalism, the tragic and the dialectical world vision (Mulhem, 1975; Zimmerman, 1978).
PART II: APPLICATION TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

In this second part of the chapter, I will apply the theoretical framework developed in Part I to the case of the Cyprus conflict. First, I will offer a short narration of the Cyprus conflict as background knowledge to the analysis that will follow that concerns the way the educational system promulgates a certain hegemonic historical narrative of collective struggle to undo the injustices caused by a collective trauma that paradoxically reinforces the partition of Cyprus as I show. I will also offer some insights of the articulation of the three genetic processes (microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis) through research findings from our lab spanning the years 2003-2021 and some autobiographical observations. In the end, in light of the empirical findings presented I will offer some further theoretical integration and discuss some critiques coming from scholars working in similar traditions.

Setting the scene for an understanding of sociogenetic processes: The Cyprus issue in its historical perspective

Cyprus history is often depicted as a long succession of different rulers: Assyrian, Persian, Alexander the Great, Ptolemy of Egypt, Roman, Byzantines, Arabs, Crusaders, Lusignans, Venetians. In 1571 Cyprus became part of the Ottoman Empire until it changed hands when administration was ceded to the British in 1878. After the First World War the British officially annexed Cyprus to the British Empire. According to the Official Census of Population of 1946 during the British Colonial period Greek-Cypriots (henceforth GCs) comprised 80% of the population and Turkish-Cypriots (henceforth TCs) 18%. The TCs were living, in minority numbers in the towns, in 105 purely Turkish-Cypriot villages and in many mixed villages peacefully together for hundreds of years until the ethno-nationalist projects of the 19th and 20th century of Greece and then Turkey where imported in Cyprus and caused the first intercommunal frictions that broke out in 1957 and 1958. This was during the 1955-1959 anti-colonial struggle of GCs organised by EOKA² for liberation from the British and union with Greece, and the corresponding nationalist struggle of the leadership of TCs organised by TMT³ for ‘taksim’, that is the partition of Cyprus into two parts, one Greek and one Turkish (Attalides, 1979).

²Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)
³Türk Mukavemet Teşkilati (Turkish Resistance Organisation)
In 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was established as an independent bi-communal partnership state under a consociational constitution (a form of democratic power sharing between the two communities). Such a constitution was then seen by both communities as a temporary solution and the first step towards ‘enosis’ (union with Greece) for GCs and ‘taksim’ (partition of the island) for TCs. The Greek Cypriots' feeling was that the constitutional privileges accorded to the Turkish community, that was seen as a minority, were unfair and that they should only be guaranteed minority rights in the Republic of Cyprus; the Turkish Cypriots claimed that these were the just rights of a co-founding community. Soon, particular provisions relating to taxes and the autonomy of municipalities brought frictions between the two communities and a gridlock in the normal functioning of the state (Markides, 1977). In December 1963 intercommunal conflict erupted after the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, proposed constitutional amendments to improve the functionality of the Cypriot state, that were perceived by the TC leadership as a move that removed almost all their rightful claims as co-founders of the Republic, and that was aiming at downgrading their community to the status of a minority. The armed conflicts that ensued led to the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot ministers from the Cabinet.

The fighting between extremists from both sides, lasted throughout 1963 and 1964. TCs began retreating from isolated rural areas and villages into enclaves. After 1967 intercommunal strife ceased and Makarios started to turn away from Union with Greece towards a more independent policy resisting the dictates of the Greek military junta that came to power in 1967 in Athens.

In 1974 a Coup was staged by the right wing extremist group EOKA B in Cyprus and the Greek Junta, against the president, Archbishop Makarios, in order to bring about union with Greece followed by a Turkish military offensive that was allegedly done to restore the constitutional order but actually resulted to ethnic cleansing of a big part of Cyprus to materialise taksim (partition). As a result, all the GCs (160,000) living in the areas in northern Cyprus now occupied by the Turkish military forces were forced to flee to the south, and 45,000 TCs moved to the north in 37% of the land of the island. (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Cyprus in 1960 and today
The intercommunal conflict of 1963-64 and the war of 1974 impacted the lives a lot of people in Cyprus and in both direct and indirect ways as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Direct and Indirect experience of Conflict in 1963-64 and 1974 in the two communities of Cyprus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GCs</th>
<th>TCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has your home been lost (became refugee)?</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been injured due to these events?</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been captured?</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a member of your family's or a close friend's lost his/her home (became refugee)?</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a member of your family or a close friend been injured?</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a member of your family or a close friend been captured?</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a member of your family or a close friend been missing?</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a member of your family or a close friend been killed?</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two communities became geographically completely segregated in 1974. In 1983 the TC leadership established a breakaway state in the northern part of Cyprus internationally recognised only by Turkey. UN resolutions condemned the establishment as an illegal act and the European Commission of Human Rights in 1999 has described the self-styled ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ breakaway state as "a subordinate local administration of Turkey operating in Cyprus".

The status quo on the island today is that of division, from a UN patrolled buffer zone, of the divided country. On 23 April 2003 the Turkish Cypriot leader announced that he would unilaterally partially lift the travel restrictions that had been enforced since the Turkish intervention/invasion.
of 1974, and which had prevented Greek Cypriots from crossing into the northern part of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots from crossing into the south. In the period 2003-2020 further checkpoints opened totalling 9 in 2020.

One year after the first opening of checkpoints, in April 2004 Greek Cypriots rejected a UN sponsored plan to reunite Cyprus under a federal state by 76% whilst Turkish Cypriots accepted it with 65%. Just after that The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 but the *acquis communautaire* was suspended in the north pending a solution of the Cyprus problem. After the failed UN effort in 2004 negotiations stalled for a few years and with the election of new leadership in the Greek Cypriot community in 2008 full fledged negotiations restarted. After some progress made they were stalled again in 2010 with the election of nationalist leader in the Turkish Cypriot community. In 2013 the presidential elections in the Greek Cypriot community brought to power Nicos Anastasiades who as the leader of DISY back in 2003 supported a Yes vote on the Annan Plan but little progress was achieved until 2015 when the Turkish Cypriots brought again at the negotiating table as their leader a pro-reconciliation veteran politician Mustafa Akinci which gave a new impetus to the negotiations with significant progress made in the 2015-2017 period in order to reach a comprehensive settlement on the basis of a bizonal, bi-communal federation. The dossiers that were under discussion concerned (1) Governance and Power Sharing, (2) Property, (3) Territory, (4) Economic Affairs, (5) European Union Affairs and (6) Security and Guarantees.

In 2017 UN secretary General Guterres brought all interested parties and Guarantor countries (Turkey, Greece and the UK) into a summit at Crans Montana, Switzerland. There he proposed the so called Guterres package as a give and take peace package that would essentially give political equality to Turkish Cypriots, end Turkish occupation and alter the guarantor security provisions of the three Guarantor powers.

In June 2017 the negotiation effort came to its climax in a summit of the two communities, Greece, Turkey and the UK as the guarantor powers with an EU representative also taking part in the negotiations to ensure that any solution would be in line with the European *aqui*. The Conference on Cyprus in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, at the end of June 2017 was widely seen as the closest the parties involved in the Cyprus issue had ever come to reaching a settlement. After a week of

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4Certain areas, like the city of Varosha for example, are still partly closed to the public by the Turkish military and Greek Cypriot internally displaced people are not allowed to return in their homes.
intensive negotiations, however, in the early morning of 7 July, Secretary-General António Guterres announced to reporters that, despite considerable efforts, the Conference was closing without an agreement. Soon after that the UN Secretary General called on all parties to take time off to reflect and asked the leaders of the two communities to jointly agree on terms of reference for negotiations to resume.

The period of no negotiations continues until today however; in the meantime a negative development emerged which is the claim by Turkey that they have changed policy now supporting a two state solution instead of a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. A newly elected Turkish Cypriot nationalist leader in 2020 Ersin Tatar also followed this position lowering the chances for reaching an agreed solution any time soon.

A detailed chronology of change of leadership in the two communities and milestones in the negotiations can be seen below, as produced by the Cyprus Dialogue Forum⁵

⁵ https://libguides.cydialogue.org/ld.php?content_id=31704730
Figure 2. A timeline of negotiations of the Cyprus problem
The Ontogenesis of Social Representations of the Cyprus Issue as Significant Structures

Given the multifaced nature of the Cyprus problem representations of the Cyprus issue relate to all dimensions of the problem, for example property, territory, power sharing, representations of others, representations of the past etc. However, if one wants to understand the core of the representation in each community then the best way to approach this is to study the educational processes in the two communities that produce new political subjectivities in relation to the problem.

In Cyprus where two communities with distinct linguistic and religious backgrounds are geographically divided across ethnic lines for almost half a century, different social representations have evolved in each community, especially regarding the Cyprus problem and its history. Such narratives are politically manipulated by various political elites and the state administration for the corresponding “national collective struggles” in each community. The systematic use of rituals, national symbols (see Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou & Vrachimis, 2014), memorials, commemorations, national struggle museums (Makriyianni, 2006), and politically driven manipulation of the media (Avraamidou & Psaltis, 2020) and the educational system all contributed to the creation of different social representations of the past. The teaching of history in public schools reflected a specific official master narrative in both communities (Erhürman, 2014; Makriyianni, 2006; Makriyianni, Psaltis & Latif, 2011; Papadakis, 2008; Psaltis, 2012a) that largely contributes, as we will show below, to prejudice and distrust towards members of the other community when uncritically internalised by the individual.

According to Papadakis (2008) the central nationalistic historical narrative in the Greek Cypriot (henceforth GC) textbooks is one that begins with the arrival of Greeks (14th century BC) in Cyprus that leads to its Hellenization, where the moral centre is Greeks (of Cyprus) and the major enemy is Turks. The plot concerns a struggle for survival by Cypriot Hellenism against foreign conquerors and the tragic end is the “Barbaric Turkish Invasion” and occupation of 37% of Cyprus.

The corresponding Turkish Cypriot (henceforth TC) narrative is an alternative narrative that challenged the separatist and nationalistic narrative that was in place in 2004, the new history books for the history of Cyprus, written by the new elected leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat, offered an alternative narrative that challenged the separatist and nationalistic narrative that was in place.
Rums (Greek Cypriots). The plot concerns a struggle for survival by the Turks of Cyprus against Greek Cypriot domination. The war of 1974 marks a happy ending with the “Happy peace operation” by Turkey in Cyprus which saved Turkish Cypriots from a pending union of Cyprus with Greece.

Such official narratives clearly promote a particular form of collective remembering of victimisation by others (Psaltis, 2016). Adherence to the official narratives is not only predictive of threats (of both realistic and symbolic form and group esteem) but through these threats prejudice is increased and further distrust is created between the two communities in Cyprus that is eventually reflected in reduced wish to co-exist with the other community in the future (Psaltis et al. 2017). The ontogenesis of the social representation of the Cyprus issue for Greek Cypriots is mostly a process of internalising a feeling of one sided victimisation which is formed quite early on. This can be mostly attributed to the Educational Policy of “I do not forget and I struggle” (Den xechno kai agonizomai).

This policy in the case of the Greek Cypriots emerged a few years after the mass displacements of 1974. It did not happen immediately after since in the first months after the Turkish invasion internally displaced persons believed that they would soon return to their properties with a swift solution of the problem. However, after a couple of years they realized that this might take much longer. There was also a public discussion about the need for a long term struggle (makrochronios) and the attempt to cultivate a sense of unity and patience to achieve the goal of everybody returning to their properties.

A primary objective of the Greek Cypriot educational system since 1974 has been to educate the new generation of Greek Cypriots about the part of the island that is occupied by Turkey (Christou, 2006) and instill the desire for a reunification of the island. A major challenge for the Greek Cypriot educational system since 1974 has been to impart the values of “humanism, justice, freedom and democracy” while remaining faithful to the “preservation of our national and cultural identity” (Christou, 2006; Maratheftis 1992:146). The aims can be clearly seen below in a Circular

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up to that point [see Papadakis (2008) for an analysis of these short lived books]. However, in 2010 with the election of a new nationalist administration these textbooks were replaced by new ones that reverted to the old nationalist narrative described in the text above (see Makriyianni, Psaltis, & Latif, 2011 for a more updated discussion).
sent to the educators (policy brief) by Ministry of Education (1994) that stated as the aims of “I know, I do not forget and I struggle” the following:

1) To help students learn about the occupied places, to keep the memory of the occupied places alive, and to cultivate the hope and will to struggle for the return;
2) To help students know and understand human rights as they have been recognized by international organizations and to work towards their implementation in Cyprus; and
3) To help students appreciate and respect all the elements (tradition, customs, manners, merits) that promoted the ethnic and physical survival of Greek Cypriots and to participate in the struggle against the dangers faced by their country.

In Figure 3 below some material artefacts relating to Den Xechno can be seen.

“I do not forget and I struggle”
This is policy has been criticised by academics in Cyprus who see a number of problems in its rationale (Christou, 2006). According to Christou (2006) soon after 1974 the Ministry of Education, with curricular changes, directed teachers to incorporate in their courses references to the events of 1974, the plight of Greek-Cypriot refugees and the importance of remembering the part of Cyprus that was occupied by Turkey. This is how a colleague from the educational sciences described the activities around the policy:

“At the elementary school level, three books aid teachers in creating lesson plans on these themes and integrating them in courses such as Greek language, history, geography, music, and the visual arts. The books are filled with pictures, personal stories and poems about life in the occupied part of the island before 1974 and the refugees’ experience of displacement. Though less regularly, such references continue up to the level of the gymnasium and the lyceum. In general, however, everyday life in Greek Cypriot schools is infused with commemorations of 1974, and all school celebrations (at the primary and secondary levels) include direct references to the Cyprus Problem” (Christou, 2006, p. 289).

Whilst this bombardment of students with a one sided victimisation narrative and “overdetermination of meaning” is present from the genetic social psychology point of view it should not be assumed that all children will passively internalise this master narrative. One research by Chara Makriyianni (2006) helped shed light on this question when Greek Cypriot elementary school students aged 9-10 were asked to write a short “History” of their homeland in 2002-2003. To put their narratives into a time perspective one has to be reminded that this point in time is already almost 30 years after the events of 1974, the parents of these children where probably in their early 40s or younger so about 1/3 of them would have been personally displaced (first generation IDPs) at the age of 10 (see Makriyianni, 2006, p. 240 for more details). One child wrote the following:

“My homeland is Cyprus. Cyprus is 8000 years old. Its capital is Nicosia. The mother homeland is Greece and we are Greek-Cypriots. In 1974 there was an invasion by the Turks and we were conquered. Some people are now refugees and they long for their villages (Girl, 4th Grader)”.

A shorter narrative written by a boy with no reference to Greece read like this:
“My homeland is Cyprus. Various people came and conquered us. The last enemies were the Turks. They made war against us and took half of Cyprus (Boy, 4th Grader)”

If we compare the two narratives we can see one of the main internal ideological tensions in the Greek Cypriot community relating to identity politics. It is the tension between a hellenocentric and cypriocentric position. The first sees Cyprus as part of greater Hellenism whilst the second suggests a more localized sense of moral center and national identity. However, both at their core share an asymmetrical structure of small and weak Cyprus as the unprovoked victim by mighty and expansionist Turkey. This can be clearly seen in the two variations of children drawings below (see Figure 4 below).

Figure 4. A cypriotcentric and a hellenocentric view of one sided victimisation

Below are some more excerpts given by Chara Makryianni (2006) in her PhD thesis exploring the representations of Greek Cypriot 9-10 year old students, which is very telling as it shows how
messages from Den Xehno policy and indirect personal experience of internal displacement is objectified in short narratives that make use of narrations as traditional or exemplary types that serve memory functions which is a projected future of a “free cyprus”.

My homeland is Cyprus. In Cyprus the war between England and Cyprus took place, the Turkish invasion and now we are enslaved by the Turks. Many soldiers were killed; there were orphans, missing people, refugees, and enslaved people. I love my country very much. (Boy from urban school, Date: 10/11/2002)

My homeland is Cyprus. I was born and have lived here for nine years. Cyprus has made loads of wars. Even today is enslaved. Turks do not allow us to go to the other half. My country is a small island. I love her a lot and I do not want to live in any other country. (Girl from urban school, no. 146, Date: 10/11/2003).

My homeland was enslaved by the Turks because Turks came and took away from us our prettiest cities, we made a lot of war and thus we were enslaved. The war, when the Turks came, it was horrific because they took our mother from her house and forced her to leave Morfou with only the clothes she wore. (Girl from urban school, no. 512, Date: 8/3/2004)

My homeland is Skylloura, I think it’s there. It is wonderful, especially in the old times before Turks destroy it in 1974. Skylloura is one of the best villages of Cyprus. (Boy from urban school, no. 132, Date: 10/11/2002)

My homeland is Cyprus and many years ago the Turks came and made war on us. In the end they won and now they have seized almost half of Cyprus. We fought with all our efforts for our country. We were very brave and courageous. I was very sad when they took Cyprus. I used to remember some of the soldiers of Cyprus but now I have forgotten about them. (Boy from urban school, no. 343, Date: 20/1/2004)

Around the same period (before the opening of the checkpoints in 2003) another study by Christou (2006) was very enlightening as she asked 15-18 year old high school Greek Cypriot students to discuss what they make out of the Den Xechno slogan. Christou (2004) also notes how ideology can operate under a ‘hidden curriculum’, with the tacit ways in which knowledge and behavior get
constructed, outside the usual course materials and formally scheduled lessons. Christou rightly identifies a major weakness of the way the Den Xechno policy operates.

“The re-united and independent Cyprus is the professed goal, but, as I am arguing here, this goal, for the new generation, represents an official though largely empty imagination. Young Greek Cypriots reiterate “our desire to go back to our homes,” but this is where their imagining of the future stops: the vision of re-united communities, which is crucial for a peaceful solution, does not exist”. (p.299). As she concludes “The political subjectivity of the new generation of Greek Cypriots is constituted through a historical definition of struggle that oscillates between armed resistance and the silent persistence of memory”.

To sum up, the core of the significant structure of social representations is formed quite early in childhood. This can be described as an asymmetrical triadic configuration of control as shown in Figure 5 below. The shorter the distance between the other-object relationship the stronger are the expectations of control of the object by other. Such a claim of control depicted in Figure 5 in the case of the Cyprus issue is of course resisted by Greek Cypriots.

![Figure 5: A triadic configuration of control](image)

Figure 5. A triadic configuration of control

What is most striking in the significant structure above is the absence of Turkish Cypriots from the picture. The empty imagination has no place for Turkish Cypriots who are not actors in the history of Cyprus. The objective possibility in Goldmann’s terms of this representation is exhausted into the quest for freedom for Cyprus to be achieved not by a compromise solution that will include the re-establishment (after 1960) of power sharing with Turkish Cypriots, as envisioned by the UN supported plan since 1977 in the form of a BBF, but with simply the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the end of occupation of Cyprus. If anything becomes clear about
Turkish Cypriots by the end of their career in public school around 17 years old is that Turkish Cypriots were given over-privileges in the 1960 constitution that were unfair to the majority (Greek Cypriots) and that they (TCs) rebelled against the legal state in 1963-1964. Thus it suggests that a majoritarian unitary state that offers TCs minority rights would be all TCs could ask for.

The orientation towards otherness (the tip of the iceberg taking the form of prejudice) formed by this Den Xehno policy are clearly seen in the work of Makriyianni (2006, p. 204), where the same representative sample of the 9-10 year old students who offered their short historical narratives of Cyprus were also asked to state their feelings towards both Turkish Cypriots and Turks. The results regarding feelings towards Turkish Cypriots were as follows: 5% stated that they liked TCs a lot, 21% that they like TCs, most stated they neither liked nor disliked TCs (40%), 21% stated that they do not like TCs and 12% that they do not like them at all. So on the whole the dominant feeling was neutral to negative which can be mostly explained through the absence of knowledge about Turkish Cypriots as a community, their history in Cyprus since 1571 as well as their rightful claims to power sharing in Cyprus as the cofounding community of the 1960 constitution.

When it came to the attitude towards Turks the dominant feeling was significantly different and more negative to very negative with the majority of students (54%), stating that they do not like Turks at all and 25% stating that they do not like them. Only 16% stated neutral feelings and 5% said that they like Turks. Only 1% said that they liked Turks a lot which is only expected given that Turkey and the Turks occupy the position of the enemy and the Turkish state as the barbaric occupier in the hegemonic narrative.

In the case of TCs the asymmetrical configuration of control would concern the loss of political equality and power sharing in 1963 accompanied by a threat of marginalization as the weaker community by GCs who would be the main enemy “other”. These are the reasons that a number of research undertaken in both communities usually finds that the levels of threats, prejudice and distrust towards the other community (GCs) is higher compared to the levels of threats, prejudice and distrust experienced towards TCs by GCs. Higher communal identification is also usually found in the TC community whilst SDO levels are lower which would be expected from a non-dominant group in Cyprus. Despite this TC political parties have not stigmatized crossing to the other side as the “political non-recognition” discourse could not easily be applied to the south.
The consequences of the empty imagination of the 9-10 year old Greek Cypriot students studied in 2003 can be captured 17 years later in a research just published that compared the views of 18-35 year olds with the views of 36-54 year olds and 55+ on the Cyprus issue in 2020 (Psaltis, et al. 2021) and another research by Dizdaroglu (2020).

The “outcomes” of an educational system 17 years on: Youth and the Cyprus issue in 2020

Recent research has pointed to certain generational differences about representations of the Cyprus problem, political culture and intergroup relations in research participants of the age group 18-35 in both communities (Dizdaroglu, 2020; Psaltis et al. 2021). In both communities there is a sense of alienation and low participation in politics and election processes, which seems to be related to a feeling of distrust for political parties, the government and even the parliament. This seems to be both because the youth feel non-recognised as active citizens by the parties but also as we know from the findings of the European Social Survey (ESSR9) data collected in 2018-2019 the GC youth in their vast majority do not feel confident in contributing to politics. This obviously in the GC community has to do with the low levels of agency that institutional structures in Cyprus support (educational system, the church and some traditional family values that keep the youth at the parental house sometimes until they get married).

On bicomunal relations, there is more recognition by Turkish Cypriot youth than Greek Cypriot youth of the importance of the opening of checkpoints and more frequent crossing to the south (about 50% of TCs cross regularly) for shopping or excursions. GC youth cross much less often and are not so keen on the opening of more checkpoints. This is probably because they are trapped into the discourse of some so called GC “centre” but maximalist political parties that “crossings normalise partition” or “offer moral recognition and financial support to the non-recognised state in the north,” whereas the reality of social psychological findings is that the opposite of this discourse is true. On a more optimistic note, half of the youth in both communities state as a reason for not visiting the other side that “it just didn’t happen”,--thus not evoking hatred or ideological resistance to the idea of having intergroup contact (Dizdaroglu, 2020). Similarly, the majority (around 60-70% in both communities) approve of socialisation of members of the two communities under various conditions, even when some of them assume member of other communities being in positions or roles of higher status (e.g. boss at work) (Dizdaroglu, 2020). This shows that GC youth would support contact and relationships between the two communities
but not crossings of GCs to the other side which they see an act that has negative consequences for the collective struggle not to allow the recognition of the illegal state in the north of Cyprus. At the same time, the lack of a federalist mentality in the youth is also present as there is a low acceptance of the idea of a president of the country from the other community (Dizdaroglu, 2020) which can be explained by the educational content transmitted through the educational system as discussed earlier. This is probably related to educational content of the last years of the Lyceum since in the research of Kyriakides (2020) as students moved from the gymnasium to the lyceum the percentage of those who disagreed with the idea that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can rule Cyprus together increased.

In Psaltis et al. (2021) we found that the GC Youth (18-35) compared to older people are: Less likely to wish for peace, less likely to expect that peace will be achieved and less likely to support peace supporting steps. Importantly, however, this is not because they are more prejudiced or distrustful than older people. In fact, they score significantly lower on the ethos of conflict scale (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2015). So their weakened willingness to take positive steps should be more interpreted as the result of alienation and apathy than fanaticism. This is supported by another finding that they are less likely compared to older people to attend events where the Cyprus issue is discussed. The youth are also more uncompromising compared to older people. But the majority is still in favour of the idea that the solution to the Cyprus issue should satisfy the needs of both communities (around 70% compared to around 85% in older people).

There is also less enthusiasm in the youth about taking steps to promote BBF compared to older people. The less appetite for BBF is seen in another question where they are asked if they wish for a mutually agreed solution on the basis of BBF. On this question 47.8% expressed no wish, and 52.3% expressed wish for a solution on the basis of BBF. In older age groups the wish was much higher and came closer to 70% (Age comparisons can be seen in the Appendix I and II for GCs and TCs correspondingly).
The year 2003 as a historical turning point in Cyprus?

This brief historical framing of the Cyprus issue makes clear that the opening of crossing checkpoints on 23 April 2003 was a unique situation of rupture (Zittoun et al., 2003) of the taken for granted of the no-contact status quo that continued for 30 years since 1974. Any meaningful analysis of contact in Cyprus needs to keep this historical fact in perspective. People had to face the very tangible dilemma ‘to cross or not to cross?’ (see Demetriou, 2007). They had to master the unfamiliar situation of deciding whether they would be visiting or not their houses, now occupied by other people or troops, or places of highly symbolic value and nostalgia that they had left under life-threatening conditions. Crossing the checkpoints and coming into contact with people now occupying a home one left 30 years ago can be an emotionally tormenting but also ideologically laden and filled with tensions that create questions of the capacity of intergroup contact to lead to the reduction of prejudice, the promotion of trust and the reconstruction of the representations of the Cyprus problem and its hegemonic narrative under these unique conditions.

In the context of Cyprus a recent meta-regression of more than 25 studies (Psaltis & Cakal, 2021) undertaken in both communities of Cyprus since 2006 revealed that quantity of contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots relates to reduced levels of prejudice in both communities. In fact the mean effect size identified in both communities (r=−0.37 for Greek Cypriots and r=−0.32 for Turkish Cypriots) is substantially higher than the mean effect size of r=−0.22 reported by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) in their meta-analysis.

In the same year, 2003, there was a change in leadership with the election of Tasos Papadopoulos in the Greek Cypriot community with the support of leftist party and pro-reconciliation AKEL in 2003. One year later Cyprus also joined the EU. Both of these developments as well as the opening of the checkpoints led to a reconsideration of the educational policy of I do not forget and I struggle and signaled the beginning of an effort for a general educational reform that seemed at that time promising in revising the ethnocentric master narrative.

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7 A detailed chronology of political developments relating to the Cyprus issue can be found at the following online project of the Cyprus Dialogue Forum, a bicomunal non-formal dialogue that aims to support and complement the formal peace process in Cyprus: [https://libguides.cydialogue.org/political/chronology](https://libguides.cydialogue.org/political/chronology)

8 One year later, in 2004 Cyprus both communities voted on a UN secretary general Annan plan for a solution to the Cyprus issue and Cyprus joined the EU with the EU aquis suspended in the north pending a solution to the Cyprus problem. These were years of great political and grassroots mobilisations that offered a fertile ground for renegotiating social representations of the Cyprus issue in both communities.
In a circular by the Ministry of Education and Culture, November 2003 we find elements of attempting rapprochements with the Turkish Cypriot community and mention of a need for a solution to the Cyprus issue that would secure Greek Cypriot needs:

“so that all the inhabitants of our homeland live peacefully and brotherly in a new European Cyprus, under conditions of security, peace, freedom, prosperity, and justice.”

“a solution that will secure the end of occupation, the withdrawal of occupying troops and settlers, the refugees’ return to their homes, the disclosure of the missing people’s fate, and the reunification of our island”

With the rejection of the UN plan by the Greek Cypriot leadership of Papadopoulos in 2004 history education reform was put on hold until 2008. This was due to a resurgence of nationalist feelings and pressures from the church not to revise history text books as it was seen by them as an effort to “dehellenise” Greek Cypriots (Makriyianni Psaltis & Latif, 2011). However, when the leader of leftist party AKEL Dimitris Christofias was himself elected the president of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008 (see Figure 1 above) the educational reform effort obtained a new impetus. In the Turkish Cypriot community the election of a left wing government in 2004 made some radical changes in the history teaching in terms of syllabus and methodology by promoting both multiperspectivity and a more Cypriot-centric orientation in new history textbooks that replaced the previous nationalistic separatist teaching with clear messages of co-operation between the two communities (Papadakis, 2008; Psaltis et al., Perikleous et al., 2021).

2008: A new policy by the Ministry

The newly elected Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and leftist and pro-reconciliation ideological partner Mehmet Ali Talat met soon after the February election in March 2008 and agreed to start fully-fledged negotiations. They established 6 working groups and 7 technical committees that would work for facilitating collaboration between the two communities in various spheres of the everyday life (Health, Crime, Environment, Cultural Heritage, Opening of more checkpoints etc). They also decided to reopen Ledra Street in divided capital Nicosia as a
Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Between May-July 2008, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the negotiation framework of a bizonal bicomunal federation with political equality. They agreed that this partnership would have a Federal Government with a single international “personality”, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State of equal status. They agreed in principle on single sovereignty and citizenship. Finally, they agreed that the solution reached would be put to separate simultaneous referenda.

In August 2008, before the commencement of the school year, the Greek Cypriot Minister of Education, Dr Andreas Demetriou, an academic, a developmental psychologist who had worked for years on developing a neo-Piagetian theory of intelligence, sent the aims of the school year 2008-2009 to all teachers. The first aim referred to the “cultivation of a culture of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect and co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots”. This was the first time in the history of Cyprus that such an aim was set by the Ministry of Education and it was promoted whilst the Den Xechno policy was still kept in place. This was bound to lead to tensions given that many teachers saw the two aims as incompatible whilst others attempted to redefine the meaning of the I do not forget policy in a way that it could become compatible (Charalambous, Charalambous & Zembylas, 2014) with the spirit of reconciliation.

Identity positions in the representational field of the Cyprus issue
Reactions to the new policy ranged from enthusiastic support to vehement rejection (see Makriyianni, Psaltis & Latif, 2011). As in the case of the reception of psychoanalysis in France in the end of 50s one could similarly understand the reception of this new policy depending on the ideological positions within the Greek Cypriot community. These reactions can be rendered intelligible by identifying the various significant structures or transindividual subjects in the representational field of the Cyprus issue. In an earlier research project in 2006-2007 we explored intergroup dynamics in Cyprus and representations of the past. There we had the chance to explore the representations of the Cyprus issue in adults 18 years old and over, in relation to the role of intergroup contact between Greek Cypriots (GCs) and Turkish Cypriots (TCs) and various variables that tap the quality of intercommunal relations in Cyprus. This was a large-scale questionnaire survey with a representative sample from both communities (N= 800 GCs and N= 853 TCs) and was made possible by the partial lifting of travel restrictions across the UN buffer zone after the 23rd of April 2003. The questionnaire in particular explored the amount and the quality of contact between members of the two communities, national identification, trust,
forgiveness, threats (realistic, symbolic, distinctiveness threat), intergroup anxiety, perspective taking, intergroup salience, and attitudes towards the other community (see Psaltis, 2012a for details).

Attitude towards “motherlands” (Turkey and Greece) and wish for the use of their symbols (flag, national anthem) by the corresponding community was labelled as *Helleno/Turco centrism*. On the contrary, *Cypriocentrism* (Peristianis, 1995) was operationalized as the wish for use of Cypriot national symbols and civic identity, and feelings of detachment from motherlands. Furthermore, there were questions that explored the representations of the history of the Cyprus problem and in particular interpretation of the events of intercommunal strife in 1963-1967, the nature of the Cyprus problem and its causes and views concerning organisations like the Greek Cypriot EOKA and the Turkish Cypriot TMT that fought for *enosis* (union with Greece) and *taksim* (partition), correspondingly. Finally, the questionnaire included questions that tried to tap the level of acceptance of a variety of possible solutions to the Cyprus issue (Federation, Unitary state of consociationalism as in 1960, Retaining the Status Quo, Two states solution).

An analysis of this set of data from a social representations perspective (see Psaltis, 2012a) made clear that different representations of the Cyprus issue have indeed evolved between the two communities as they have been geographically divided across ethnic lines for almost half a century. Importantly, however, this research identified three different identity positions within each community: the *Pro-reconciliation*, the *Communitarian* and the *Ethno-nationalist* position. From the results, it appeared that in both communities, people in the *Pro-reconciliation* clusters are people who show a very positive orientation towards members of the other community on a series of variables (trust, contact, forgiveness) and who also score lower on perceived threats and intergroup anxiety. In fact, the *Pro-reconciliation* clusters in the two communities are almost identical in the profile of their views expressing peace activists, bi-communal NGOs who advance a social representations project (see Bauer & Gaskell, 1999) of joint collective action for the solution of the problem. In Lucien Goldmann’s terminology the objective possibility of this significant structure was that of the vision of a reunited Cyprus. These individuals covered the political spectrum from pro-reconciliation left to liberal cosmopolitan right and NGOs doing bi-communal work although the majority came from leftist parties. The stronger Cypriocentric views of this position suggested that the aim was to form a superordinate political community of Cypriots
that includes both GCs and TCs, a solidarity formed on either a basis of cultural similarity between the two communities or a civic form of constitutional patriotism.

The communitarian position in each community was described by more adherence to the ethno-national symbols (flag, national anthem of ‘motherlands’) and was related to high levels of perceived realistic and distinctiveness threats as well as lower levels of trust and contact with the other community. In the two communities these positions share structural similarities as they represent a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995), where the ethical horizon of the concern of participants is constrained to the limits of their own community fed by the mundane reality of everyday living in two geographically separated communities for decades. Politically this position is related to parties of the patriotic left or the so called “centre” traditionally hard-line and maximalist on the Cyprus that often express wish for a federation with the “right content” (not accepting political equality, or demanding both the withdrawal Turkish troops and settlers or immigrants who came to the north of Cyprus after 1974) and sometimes veers towards an antifederalist stance altogether using the majoritarian discourse of “one man one vote” (Loizides, 2016, 2020).

Lastly, the ethno-nationalism position was expressed in the two communities with ideas of Greek and Turkish ethno-nationalism respectively, forming a mirror image of each other where the ethical horizon is a larger ethnic community that includes the mainland nationals but excludes the other community in Cyprus, as suggested by the low levels of intercommunal contact, trust and forgiveness and high levels of prejudice and threats of this position. Politically this position is related to the conservative right wing DISY and extreme right-wing parties (Allileggyi, Elam).

So to return to the reactions to the new policy of 2008 came from the communal and the ethnonationalist stance at the grassroots level. At the institutional level it came from EOKA fighter organisations and the church who again saw an effort by the government to “dehellenise” the island. Reactions also came from officials in the ministry itself who were close to the church and the so called maximalist centre parties against the policy of the minister who saw an opportunity to attract votes from the right of the political spectrum, since in the first two years of the policy the right wing party of Anastasiades (who supported a YES vote during the 2004 referendum) did not resist the policies. However, after a couple of years DISY started resisting the efforts for a compromise solution and by 2010 when the Turkish Cypriots elected a new nationalist leader they
had already withdrew their support to the pro-reconciliation policies of the ruling party (both for the solution of the problem and the educational policies). Their resistance started when they probably realised that they started loosing votes to the so called “centre” maximalist parties and the newly established far-right ELAM that was the sister party of the neo-nazi party Golden Dawn in Greece. By 2010 AKEL was left on its own politically to materialise any positive changes in the educational system and then succumbed to resistance not actually achieving any substantial change in the revision of the history curriculum and textbooks or with their pro-intergroup contact policies. In fact as it can be seen in the Appendix 2010 was the year that most GCs showed negative feelings towards TCs in their majority.

**Sociogenetic change: Transformation of significant structures from 2007 to 2017**

A similar mapping of the positions in the representational field was conducted 10 years later in 2017. The corresponding Two-step Cluster analysis in the Greek Cypriot community was interesting because-- compared to the similar analysis of 2007 (Psaltis, 2012)-- now a decade later, a new position emerged that was absent previously. The new position was a partitionist position, something surprising given that this was historically equivalent to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists claim to “taksim” (separation of Cyprus in two). The four positions that emerged in 2017 were the following:

1) Pro-reconciliation /Pro BBF -Federalist mentality
2) Neutral towards TCs – Favouring a Unitary State / BBF as a solution of necessity/Against partition
3) Ambivalent/Polarised attitude towards TCs – Partitionist
4) Xenophobic/ Hellenocentric – Anti-federation

First of all, it must be stated from the outset that all four groups in their majority agree that the Cyprus problem should be solved through compromise, and reject the idea of armed struggle. There is a very small percentage of extremists who do not reject armed confrontation; these are the hard core of the xenophobic / Hellenocentric-anti federal bloc, most of whom bear a grudge about the past war defeat in 1974 and want revenge. Moreover, it should be noted that
58% of the entire sample would accept BBF either as a satisfactory solution or as a solution of necessity, while about 70% clearly reject a two-state solution.

Analysis of the first group (18.8%), those in favour of the UN supported BBF and reconciliation and involved in bi-communal work and NGOs working for reconciliation, reveals the following characteristics: very positive attitude towards the other community, high level of trust, quality contact with the Turkish Cypriot community, low levels of perceived realistic and/or symbolic threats. Identity issues are distinguished by a more Cypriot-centric approach, and this position sees federation and the single state as satisfactory solutions, and rejects both the two-state solution and the status quo. The majority believe that the church should not interfere in educational matters. The majority are educated, male, and believe firmly in the need for reconciliation and forgiveness. Compared to the other three groups, this group has the least anxiety about the functionality of a future BBF state, Turkey's intervention in a federal Cyprus, and Turkish settlers acquiring citizenship in the new state. Together with the second group, they express the lowest levels of fear that GCs are not ready to coexist with TCs. On the contrary, they have the highest degree of hope that, in the event of a solution, relations with Turkey will be normalized and economic development and free movement will take place throughout Cyprus. In terms of historical consciousness one could find both the critical and the genetic types in this position, the hallmark being the future oriented imaginary of a united Cyprus that overcomes division through cooperation between the two communities.

The second group (Neutral towards TCs – Favoring a Unitary State / Federation as necessary compromise/ Against partition), which is also the dominant group (43.1%), maintains a neutral attitude towards TCs and has neutral levels of qualitative contact and trust towards TCs, but has a particularly negative attitude towards Turkey and Turkish settlers. Although they express high levels of perception of realistic and symbolic threats, and while they view the single state as an ideal solution to the Cyprus problem, they are ready to accept federation as a compromise and explicitly reject the two-state solution (90% of the group). Some of this group (about one-third) accept the status quo, but most reject it. Considering the hopes and fears relating to a possible solution on the basis of BBF, the group profile is very similar to that of the rapprochement group, but reveals significantly higher fears for the functionality of the state, Turkey’s possible
intervention in the future federation and a significantly lower degree of hope that, in the event of a solution, relations with Turkey will be normalized and economic growth will take place. This group can be further subdivided into some who support federation either as a satisfactory solution or as a solution of necessity (about 63% of this group). This group is estimated to be between 18%-23% of the general electorate, and they also seem to be influenced by the climate of optimism or pessimism prevailing in Cyprus at any given time thus being more susceptible to changing ingroup norms compared to the first group. In terms of historical consciousness it has not completely made a break with the traumatic past as there is still the fear of Turkish “expansionist” plans since the reading of history is mostly exemplary. They see Turkey as always being a lurking threat, despite there more neutral disposition towards TCs and their wish for reunification of Cyprus. For them ideally Turkish Cypriots would one day demand the end of occupation of Cyprus together with Greek Cypriots. This would be the condition of full acceptance of TCs, as partners in overthrowing Turkish occupation. At the same time, at least those who see BBF as a painful compromise and not a satisfactory solution find it difficult to accept political equality with the smaller community and share power.

The third group (Mixed attitude to TCs - partitionist) (18.6%), is comprised by an increased number of youth and their profile reflects the decades-long geographical separation of the two communities. Thus, this position is expressed by primarily younger, more educated, female, and with few emotional ties to the occupied part of Cyprus. In one sense they have become emancipated from the Den Xechno policy of “all refugees should return to their homes” but not from the idea of “expansionist Turkey”. Thus in the absence of contacts with Turkish Cypriots and increased symbolic threats, stereotypes for the present state of the north of Cyprus and political apathy, they fail to see the usefulness of reunification which could be a risk to some educated young professionals who are competing for jobs in a shrinking job market.

Although this group has, on average, neutral feelings towards the TCs, and their support comes from the big two parties (AKEL and DISY who lost hope on return of refugees or solution) there is also a minor part (coming from the extreme right wing party ELAM) with extreme negative emotions towards TCs. The group shows significant distrust, and expresses feelings of symbolic threat as they feel different to the TCs; they prefer the two- state solution or maintenance of the
status quo to federation or even the unitary state. However, about 50% said they could accept the BBF mainly if it were necessary (one may assume if it took the form of a decentralized or "loose" federation as proposed by some centre-right politicians and later in 2019-2021 by GC leader Nicos Anastasiades).

It is important to note the age of this group and consider how the educational curriculum may have contributed to their positions. A series of surveys in the Greek Cypriot community have shown a positive correlation between age and the quality of bicommunal relations/ readiness to live together with TCs. Specifically, the older the participant, the higher the wish for solution and vice versa, the younger the participants are the lower the wish for solution. This relationship is largely due to the youth never having lived with the other community, and therefore not knowing TCs. Indeed, in another research with inhabitants of formerly mixed villages we found that those who had contacts in the past or came from villages with higher intergroup contact and less conflict were today more likely to have less prejudice and distrust members of the other communities (Kende et al. in press).

Although there is a sense of Cypriotness in the historical narrative of this partitionist position, it does not go beyond the official narrative of "Turkey has always wanted to conquer the whole of Cyprus" and shows great ignorance of the mistakes or atrocities committed by the Greek Cypriot community against the Turkish Cypriot community. It has a high sense of one-sided and unfair victimisation, and this is due in large part to the educational stance that we analyzed earlier of "I Know, I Do not Forget, I Demand," that is taught from primary school onwards. Cyprus history is taught in a way that encourages perceptions of realistic and symbolic threats, bias and lack of trust (Makryianni & Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis et al., 2017). Regarding the hopes and fears in relation to a scenario of solution on the basis of BBF, this group expresses considerably more concern about the functionality of the state, the intervention of Turkey in the future federation, and/or problems with Turkish settlers who will acquire citizenship in the new state. They also present, together with the fourth group, the least hope that, in the event of a solution, relations with Turkey will be normalized and economic development and free movement will take place throughout Cyprus. It is worth noting that this group has the greatest fear of living
together, declaring that "we are unprepared as a society," “we did not grow up to live peacefully together" and “nationalists will mess things up.”

The emergence of this position should be read as a long term cohort effect and not temporary. It expresses the view of some people from the new generation that were raised in a partitioned geographical space who have normalised in their mind the partition of the island, mostly due to significant gaps in the cultivation of the relationship with the Turkish Cypriot community. This interpretation is supported by the fact that there was no relationship between IDP status and any of these stances. Nevertheless, IDPs still were more likely to accept the UNSG Guterres framework of 2017 compared to non-IDPs and were more likely to make compromises on political equality in return for the return of Morphou to GCs (Psaltis et al., 2020).

The fourth and final group (Xenophobic/ Helleno-centric – Anti-federation ) (19.5%) believes in the continuation of traditional Greek nationalism in Cyprus, characterized particularly by anti-Turkish and negative feelings towards the TCs (whom they often equate with Turks); shows the greatest mistrust, very high perceptions of symbolic and realistic threat arising from difference, and feelings of superiority arising from a generalized ethnocentric, Hellenocentric and xenophobic ethos (also against immigrants). This group is strongly opposed to federation as a solution to the Cyprus problem and sees the ideal solution to the Cyprus problem as the unitary state or "liberation," while a small extreme right-wing nationalist fraction still seeks union with Greece (enosis). However, almost half of this group sees the maintenance of the status quo or even the two-state solution as the second-best solution to avoid federation (about 40% of this group). It should be noted that despite the general anti-federal feelings of this group, one-third could accept the federation as a solution of necessity.

Most in this group are middle-aged and, therefore, apart from their traditional Hellenocentric roots, they are also influencing many in the younger generation through extreme nationalist groups and various sport clubs. This group also identifies as the most religious and the most frequent churchgoers, so they may also be influenced by church preachings. Regarding the possible solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of BBF, this group does not differ significantly from the previous partitionist group, since it is also characterized by a high degree of fear that there will be problems with the Turkish settlers who will acquire citizenship in the new state. They also have a
lower degree of hope that, in the event of a solution, relations with Turkey will be normalized and economic development and free movement will take place throughout Cyprus. Moreover, this group believes most strongly in the lack of functionality of the federal state, due to possible interventions by Turkey.

Beyond the legitimation in the view of a minority of people of partition that sometime is expressed with the words “a wall in the middle and that’s it” (toicho mes tis mesi tziai kanei) and works against conflict transformation into a mutually acceptable and sustainable solution we should not lose the bigger picture of positive changes in the same period that promote conflict transformation. The broader picture is one of a positive shift in the period 2007-2017 in both prejudice reduction, trust building (Yucel & Psaltis, 2020) and the acceptance of BBF as a compromise solution (see Appendix) due to the positive effects of intergroup contact after the opening of the checkpoints that could be seen as a mechanism reversing the negative impact of passing time on creating the partitionist mentality that we have seen above.

The working of various bi-communal technical committees and the positive climate between the two leaders in the period 2015-2017 also played a positive role in the formation of positive ingroup norms in this period. The positive climate was also transferred in education as revealed by the study of Kyriakides who collected data in 2017 from public schools from ages 7 to 17. In his findings 44% of Greek Cypriot students expressed positive feelings towards TCs, 33% neutral and 23% only showed negative feelings towards TCs. Regarding feelings towards Turks there was also an impressive improvement compared to the findings reported in 2003 by Makriyianni (2005) since 32% expressed positive feelings, 28% showed neutral feelings and 40% showed negative feelings. This was probably also due to changing ingroups norms by a positive policy introduced in 2015 and 2016 that connected peace education in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community with general anti-racists educational policies announced to educators in the beginning of the schools year as one of the general goals of the year. Finally, and maybe more importantly the two leaders decided to establish a bicommunal technical committee for education in the end of 2015. The final version of the mandate of the Bi-communal Technical Committee of Education was announced on November 26th 2015 by the two leaders in a meeting under the UN auspices comprised the following three pillars:
1. Review existing research and good practices in education in Cyprus and abroad and undertake new relevant research on how education can contribute to conflict transformation, peace, reconciliation and the countering of prejudice, discrimination, racism, xenophobia and extremism.
2. Work on devising a mutually acceptable mechanism for the implementation of confidence building measures in schools of the two educational systems and promote contact and co-operation between students and educators from the two communities.
3. Recommend best policy options and course of action that will allow co-ordination of the two educational systems, thus contributing to a viable, sustainable and functional bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.

The committee worked intensively and within the first year of its functioning produced a long and detailed report with policy recommendations under the first pillar of its mandate. This report however was never publicized by the two leaders. The committee was also restricted from the beginning by the two leaders on touching upon issues of history teaching as it was considered too sensitive. It nevertheless produced a number of policy proposals about confidence building measures under the second pillar of its mandate with its major achievement being the “Imagine programme”, a contact scheme where students and teachers could meet during school time with members of the other community financially supported by the Embassy of Germany in Cyprus. This development was somewhat ironic because these were the exact policy measures suggested back in 2010 by Andreas Demetriou and were resisted by the same party that now in power was implementing them as a new policy.

This shift towards conflict transformation became more difficult after November 2016 when there was a break in trust between the two leaders, when the GC leader Anastasiades showed cold feet to proceed to a solution on a few occasions. Around the same period the Greek minister of foreign affairs Nikos Kotzias promoted publicly and through leaks in the GC press that Greece would not agree to any solution that would not annul the securities by Turkey, Greece and the UK and would entail the withdrawal of all Turkish troops from Cyprus (see Avraamidou & Psaltis, 2020). At the same time a provocative move by extreme right wing party Elam in February 2017 that requested in parliament that schools commemorate the plebiscite of 1950 for Union of Cyprus with Greece (and was not resisted by right wing ruling party DISY) created mistrust between the two
communities. The negotiations nevertheless proceeded with an international summit in June 2017 at Crans Montana in Switzerland to reach a package agreement. The negotiations collapsed in July 2017 amidst a blame game from both sides that did not make the necessary final steps to lock a mutually agreed solution. The period 2018-2020 was quite stagnant in terms of bicommunal negotiations, although very active at the regional level. Foremost, Turkey carried out exploration and drilling for natural gas in parts of the Mediterranean that the Republic of Cyprus had delimited, in agreement with other countries, as their own EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). Turkey also undertook explorations in contested parts of the Mediterranean where Greece was laying claims, which led to the brink of a military confrontation in August 2020. At the same time, Turkey, in collaboration with nationalist Turkish Cypriot party leaders, threatened to open Varosha under Turkish Cypriot administration—a direct violation of the UN Council resolutions that demand return of Varosha to their rightful Greek Cypriot owners under UN administration. That threat was partly carried out in the days just prior to the elections for a new Turkish Cypriot leadership, when Tayip Erdogan with Ersin Tatar, who eventually won the 2020 elections for the TC leadership through heavy backing up from Turkey announced the opening of a stretch of beach for visits.

Research undertaken in years 2019 and 2020 showed that the positive sentiments of Greek Cypriots towards TCs and a BBF solution registered in 2015 and 2016 showed a lot of resilience as the aforementioned negative developments after 2017 were not reflected on a turn against the wish for solution and did not lead to worsening of the views towards Turkish Cypriots. This is probably because these events have made it clear to Greek Cypriots how dangerous for their communal interests is the continuation of the status quo. Confirming this is the fact that from 2019 to 2020 there was a significant increase in the percentage of those who reject the status quo, from 50.8% to 79.4%. (see Appendix). At the same time, the option of a two-state solution also became less acceptable, growing from 72.4% in 2019 to 80% in 2020 thus shrinking the appeal of the newly identified significant structure of partitionists.

These latest developments would suggest that many GCs have come to realize that the real options for them are not a choice between their ideal solution of a unitary state and the compromise solution of a BBF, but the choice between a compromise BBF and a costly permanent partition with no UNFICYP in the buffer zone, constant tensions with Turkey over gas exploitation and a
complete demographic change in the north. According to the prospect theory (Kahneman, 2011), people faced with a dilemma of this nature would choose the compromise solution in order to avoid the costs of permanent partition. In the last two years for example there was a steady increase in those who could either tolerate the bizonal bicommunal federation as a solution if necessity or accept it as a satisfactory solution (65% in 2019 and 76% in 2020).

Articulating microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis through some autobiographical notes

I was born in 1973 in Varosha, the new city next to historic Famagusta, now occupied by the Turkish army, which has turned it into a military zone. Given that nobody is allowed to inhabit the town after 1974, it turned into a “ghost city” filled with derelict buildings. I was thus one of the 160,000 internally displaced persons. My mother and father, after months of temporary refuge in various relative’s houses, settled down in rented accommodation, in Derynia, a vilage next to Famagusta, that also happened to be the place of birth of my father. Up to the 5th grade of the elementary school, I attended the village’s school. I still remember some of the financial hardships of the early years after 1974 and I remember my teachers promulgating the discourse of the barbaric Turkish invasion and its consequences, with our duty being to join the collective struggle for justice. I still remember my father waiting over the radio to hear news of the outcomes of the negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem, and the key to our apartment in Famagusta that my mother kept in the drawer next to her bed.

One of my first memories was visits to my grandparents’ house at Strovilia, a very small “enclaved” village, mostly comprised of a few families, relatives of my father, situated between Varosha and the UK military base of Ayios Nikolaos. Incidentally, this small village finds its place in the UNSG reports on the Cyprus issue, every six months, since 2000 when the Turkish troops moved their control from Varoshia some hundred meters to touch the UK bases9. This action violated a unique status quo, of no-man’s land; since a small strip of land at Strovilia was patrolled

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9 The recent UN Security Council resolution 685 in 2020 (can be retrieved here [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF994D7/2020_685.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF994D7/2020_685.pdf)) for example wrote “Particular reference should be made to the violations in the Strovilia enclave which characteristically manifest the Turkish policy to flagrantly disregard repeated calls of the UN Security Council to lift the continuous military status quo violation, in place since 2000. These violations not only persist but they have been exacerbated with additional ones, including through actions aimed at undermining the ability of UNFICYP to exercise its tasks.
by two soldiers for security reasons (a UN soldier and a Turkish-Cypriot soldier), whilst my relatives would be obliged to sign every Sunday their presence in the village. My visits to this place, in the beginning were a source of horror: I was terrified of the Turkish soldier who patrolled there and resided in one small house, that belonged to my aunt, with the UN soldier. I remember, years later, to have repeating nightmares until my early adulthood: me being chased by a Turkish soldier in that strip of land and/or the Turkish army moving further forward to kill the whole family and myself.

A year after 1974, my father was offered a job as a secondary school Art teacher. From then onwards, things started improving financially for our family. My mother stayed at home looking after my sister (born in 1977) and myself. In 1983, my father asked for a transfer to the divided capital, Nicosia, thinking that, my sister and I, would get better educational opportunities. He was instead transferred to Larnaca, a smaller town; we stayed for 3 years. In 1986 the whole family finally moved to Nicosia. Both my sister and I excelled in school.

Just before the end of my studies at the Lyceum there were big anti-occupation rallies organized by students and I remember myself taking part. A student who had lowered a Turkish flag from a poll in Nicosia was celebrated in the press as a little hero and attracted the admiration of many students.

Becoming an educator, back then, was considered an excellent career for “good students”, as it was a well paid, secure, civil servant’s job. Hence, I focused on successfully passing the prestigious entry exams that secured me a position at the Pedagogical Academy of Cyprus (a 3 year teacher training college). My studies there did not lead to any change of views regarding the bad Turks and certainly did not fill my ignorance gaps regarding Turkish Cypriots, as we never discussed different perspective nor were able to meet any Turkish Cypriots due to the barricades. Nevertheless, I did start developing an interest in Psychology in my studies there.

In terms of my political views, I supported the left wing patriotic party EDEK (socialists), as I was influenced by my father who was a very active member of the central committee of the party until 1990 and a bold trade-unionist for the same party at his work sphere; his strong involvement meant my early attendance in the party’s rallies and anti-occupation marches. If anything, my political stance, whilst a student at that Pedagogical Academy, had become even more negative towards any solution other than that of a unitary state, with Turkish troops out of Cyprus. I do recollect an
essay of mine (thought at that time as a valid research piece, even though my only source of reference was an encyclopedia that I had found in my father’s bookshelf), “evidencing” that federation, as a political system did not work in any country, therefore it would be catastrophic if applied to the Cyprus context. On hindsight, the literature review that I had provided would be unacceptable, by any academic standard. In my defense, the library of the Pedagogical Academy was an outdated library called Severios (that was also serving the historical school Pankyprion in the same premises a lynch of Hellenic education in Cyprus and a history of participation in the struggle of EOKA for union with Greece) that mainly had old books coming from Greece but much less on current literature. We also did not have the internet back then. However, I got a very good grade for this “research piece” and warm, public congratulations by our Tutor, who had made it clear, throughout his teachings, that he was against BBF. I was a thorough opponent of any bicommunal efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. I recollect lashing out at a colleague who revealed that he had contacts with Turkish Cypriots; I accused him of undermining the patriotic, fighting spirit that was needed for the anti-occupation struggle. It is now obvious that I was then trapped in a mind-set that considered contacts with the “other” as signs of treason and obstructive to the collective struggle, that “we”, Greek Cypriots had to sustain to end occupation by Turkey. Back then, I was convinced that the Cyprus problem was an issue of invasion and occupation by Turkey only, the main line of argument of the EDEK leader, Vassos Lyssarides.

In 1993, I was in my 20s, a graduate of the Cyprus Pedagogical Academy and a qualified primary school teacher. Immediately, I went to complete my military service that I have left unfinished in 1990. During the two years of my military service, I would, every morning, listen to an ultra nationalist radio show, feeling exhilarated by the radio producer’s militaristic language, extremely nationalistic comments and anti-Turkish accusations of expansionist Turkey and his full support of the Kurdish resistance, because “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”.

I also applied to become a military officer (cadet). I passed, with flying colors, the written exams, (IQ test and essay writing) and athletic performance. I also had to go through an oral examination-interview, where the strength of my patriotic feelings was evaluated by a) how hard I hit my foot

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In fact my first encounter with current literature in English about psychology was when I took a summer job with a good friend during my studies at the Pedagogical Academy at the newly established University of Cyprus to carry newly bought books to the Library out of their boxes. I remember with embarrassment that once some good people from the Library, today my colleagues, found me sleeping exhausted from work amongst a pile of books.
down, when saluting the officers, b) my capacity in reciting by memory a poem on the Greek revolution. Having passed all tests, I was sent to Greece ("this is Sparta") to train as a cadet.

The Greek military officers treated us Cypriots as Greeks from the periphery of Greece. A particular officer who got the impression that I was not religious enough, turned my time there into a living nightmare, with hazing and bullying. The reason? I laughed and said that I am not a real “psaltis,” when after reading my surname “Psaltis” the Officer wanted to assign me to sing psalms in the church every Sunday.

I finished my military service, in 1995, with a sense of revulsion for the army and repulsion for the military mind-set, which I considered a downgrading experience of human potentiality and misspent youth. Entering a new chapter in my life, that of a teacher was a step that I had saluted with great joy and relief.

My transition to working as an elementary school teacher could be described as being turned into an active agent in the field of Den Xechno as a teacher myself. I now remember the one-sided kind of history and religious education I taught my students. I was usually following the textbook for each new course and rarely looked for other sources to teach my students. I was not even reflective of the propagandistic nature of it. And at moments when that happened I would explain it away by thinking that we need to defend ourselves from all powerful Turkey so patriotic feelings have to be created in children.

In 1996 I was fortunate enough to take some extra courses for a year at the Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus by academics of the newly founded University of Cyprus as part of a special course that would equalize the 3 year pedagogical academy degree into a 4 year BA in Education. The influence of Professor Andreas Demetriou, a developmental psychologist (and later colleague and minister in the Demetris Christofias presidency in 2008), was decisive as it furthered my interest in Psychology and helped me grasp what academic rigor and proper research should be. He also sparked my interest in Piaget and cognitive development to the extent that I decided to obtain a second BA in Psychology. I prepared again for the national entry exams. Interestingly, my grade in History in 1996 was much lower than my grade in history during my entry exams in 1990. Probably the reason for that is that in the second time I did not just recite the pages of the textbook and tried to elaborate and deepen my thinking. I was nevertheless successful in securing a position at the Psychology department of Panteion University in Athens. This department had a strong
orientation towards social psychology and in one of my courses I discovered the work of Serge Moscovici and the social Genevan’s (Doise & Mugny, 1984) in a Greek translation in a central bookstore in Athens. After having read that book I knew that this line of research was what I wanted to study for my BA thesis which I finished in 1999 by reviewing this tradition of research on social interaction and cognitive development.

As soon as I returned back to Cyprus I was seconded for a year at the Educational Psychology Service of the Ministry of Education and Culture and in the same year I applied for an MSc in Educational Psychology at UCL. In the spring of 2000 I was invited to an interview at UCL as part of their MSc entry processes. Given my plans to visit London I thought of exploring other possibilities in universities that could accommodate my research interest about the role of social interaction in cognitive development and searching through the internet on my dial up connection to the Internet that recently made its appearance also in Cyprus I came across the work of Gerard Duveen in Cambridge who seemed to be one of the few academics in the UK who was studying social representations and cognitive development that were exactly my research interests. I sent him an email, saying I would be traveling to the UK soon and asked for a meeting to discuss a possible collaboration. As generous as Gerard always used to be he replied back that he would be happy for us to meet and arranged a meeting at his office at Corpus Christi. When we met we discussed his work with Patrick Leman, he said that he would be interested to further expand that line of research. I said that I was very much interested in this kind of work and he said that he would be happy for us to work together if I wanted to apply for an MPhil at Cambridge which I did. Some months later I was accepted in both UCL and Cambridge and finally decided to go to Cambridge for an MPhil in Social and Developmental Psychology. In my MPhil I did very well getting a first, worked on an empirical investigation of the representations of gender in social interaction around the Piagetian task of the conservation of liquids that was later published as Psaltis & Duveen (2006) and decided to continue with a PhD.

**Turning points in life**

Around that time my friendship with Chara Makriyanni, a classmate from the Pedagogical Academy was turned into a love affair. I was 27 years old then. Chara already completed a master in History Education with Peter Lee at the Institute of Education in London and she was quite critical of the propagandistic nature of our history teaching in Cyprus. I remember in our first
discussions we had disagreements about what the aims of history teaching should be, but once I started reading materials she suggested (and especially the connections of the work of Peter Lee with Piaget that made the epistemological foundations of new History much clearer in my eyes), I started revising my old views.

In the same year I had my first contact with Turkish Cypriots. My best friend arranged for me and Chara to go to a bicommmunal workshop in the only mixed village of Cyprus called Pyla/Pile in the Larnaca district facilitated by Nicos Anastasiou. There we completed an exercise of positioning landmark historical events on a “history ladder” that represented the history of Cyprus. I remember how surprised I was to see how different points were important in the narrations of the two communities and how different a meaning we attributed to events that we both identified on the timeline.

My studies at Cambridge in social developmental psychology helped me become more critical of our situation in Cyprus and of our educational system. I remember spending many hours of days in the Cambridge Library and locating books on Cyprus history from Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and UK perspectives that I never knew existed. In 2002 Chara joined me at the University of Cambridge since she was accepted to do a PhD at the Department of Education with Professor Peter Cunningham, an expert on oral history. Cohabitation with Chara in Cambridge became a constant source of new readings and discussions for me about nationalism and history, the use and abuse of history and opportunities to attend conferences of EUROCLIO where the abuse of history in other parts of the world became very clear in my mind. In one of these meetings Chara discussed with Joke van der Leeuw-Roord, then president of EUROCLIO the idea of setting up a bicommmunal NGO about history teaching in Cyprus something that would be made possible by the recent opening of the checkpoints in Cyprus on the 23rd of April 2003. A few months after the checkpoints opening we, along with other educator friends, located Turkish Cypriot teachers who were interested in the idea. This was not difficult since Turkish Cypriot teachers had a reputation of always being at the forefront of collective action to reunite Cyprus along with other trade unionists. This was the birth of the first Bi-communal NGO dealing with the sensitive issue of history teaching in a post-conflict and divided Cyprus, the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR). The Association soon became the local partner of the Council of Europe and with their support a number of teacher training seminars for teachers from both communities on
history teaching were organized every year. Nationalist press, the media and some right wing and so called center parties trade unionists attacked the work of AHDR from the beginning and although I understood why they did it, given my previous views, the organized nature these attacks also made me want to study more institutionalized propaganda in the Cypriot press which I recently had the chance to study with a colleague from media studies (Avraamidou & Psaltis, 2020).

Given my new reflective stance on nationalism and my study of intergroup relations once I finished my PhD in 2005 I looked for a way to work in the UK in a relevant field until my partner would also finish her studies in the UK. The perfect opportunity appeared when after a discussion with Miles Hewstone at Oxford (he was organizing an EASP meeting on Minority Influence in 2005 that I attended) we applied for a research grant to study intergroup contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus and we were successful, so I started working at the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Contact with Miles Hewstone.

Since 2006 I got involved in the study of intergroup relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots from a social psychological perspective. I remember how many of my stereotypes for Turkish Cypriots and Turks were deconstructed along the way. I now have many Turkish Cypriot friends and research partnerships with Turkish Cypriots. A year later I was appointed as a lecturer of social psychology at the University of Cyprus. I was the first Greek Cypriot social psychologist to work in an academic institution in Cyprus. In 2008 we had presidential elections that brought leftist Dimitris Christofias in power and my colleague Professor Andreas Demetriou in the Ministry of Education. Demetriou attempted the positive pro-reconciliation educational reform that promoted a culture of co-operation and a policy of contact between students and teachers from both communities. As we were colleagues with Andreas I had communicated to him a number of my research findings about the positive role of contact in prejudice reduction and suggestions by AHDR about history teaching. Members of AHDR during his term in the ministry were seconded in the Pedagogical Institute for the writing of new history textbooks also. AHDR also had the support of the government in the establishment of the Home for Co-operation in the UN Buffer zone in Nicosia, a Bi-communal Educational Centre for NGO’s supported by the EEA financial mechanism.

His very positive policy proposals nevertheless failed to be fully implemented due to resistance by the church, some teachers in the classroom and the trade unions as we have seen earlier.
In 2009 I was married to Chara and my son was born. He is already a 12 year old (a second generation refugee), and the children of my sister around this age also are 3rd generation refugees. I rarely discuss with my son my home in Famagusta but I do point out that somewhere in the buildings of the “ghost town” is the apartment we left in 1974 whenever we go for summer holidays in the southern areas of Varoshia. I remember how to my surprise my son came to me when he was four years old and said: “Dad, Turks are bad”. I said “why do you say that son?” “Because my grandmother said that Turks came and took our houses back in 1974”. That incident made me realise how early in life children internalize that sense of loss described as the figurative nucleus of the representation of the Cyprus problem earlier in Figure 4. My son however visited with his parents many times the Home for Co-operation in the UN patrolled Buffer Zone, at the centre of divided Nicosia from his early childhood and had the chance to meet many of our Turkish Cypriot friends and their children. He also took part in a bicommmunal meeting at the Home for Co-operation in the UN Buffer of Nicosia for children. This was organized with the support of the Ministry of Education. A more permanent contact scheme during school time in the mornings was made possible later in 2017. This is the “Imagine programme” which by 2020 had touched the lives of more than 5,000 students. The positive contribution of this programme was saluted and supported by a number of United Nations Secretary General’s reports about the Cyprus problem.

This was a programme under the aegis of the newly appointed Bicommmunal Technical Committee of Education in February 2016 in which I was appointed by the Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades along with other ex and current AHDR members. I helped in the production of a first draft of the terms of reference of this committee since I was asked by the general coordinator of the Turkish Cypriot technical committees and coordinator of the Turkish Cypriot team of the Bicommmunal Committee of education, also ex member of AHDR and personal friend, to help in this drafting.

In the last years the work of the committee has been slowed by a number of developments: 1) The Crans Montana failure in July 2017, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 that led to the closing of a number of checkpoints, and in the same year a change of leadership in the north that brought nationalist Ersin Tatar to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community who changed TC policy from supporting BBF by Akinci into support of a two state solution in Cyprus and changed a

11 https://www.ahdr.info/peace-education/58-education-for-a-culture-of-peace-imagine
number of the TC members of the committee (ex members of AHDR and other pro-reconciliation academics and supporters of BBF). The work of the committee nevertheless still functions and the projects are expected to be continued given the string support and importance given by the UN in Cyprus for the work of this committee.

**PART III: DISCUSSION AND FURTHER THEORETICAL INTEGRATION**

The genetic social psychological theory stands in a privileged position to render intelligible the reasons behind the resiliency of representations that block conflict transformation, but at the same time it can render intelligible mechanisms of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic change (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). The uncritical internalization of a reified and polarized master narrative of collective identity (both Cyprio-centric and Helleno-centric in childhood) of one sided victimization is found to curtail the agency that young people might otherwise cultivate if they were helped to hone their critical skills instead of internalizing myths and dogmas of the state and church. In that way they would be emancipated to make meaning of the social world in the past-present-future nexus in a transformative and genetic historical consciousness. As things currently stand in public education the nonsense of conflict gains meaning by situating oneself in a community whose collective trauma is anchored in a common narrative of trauma (Bekerman and Zembylas 2011) as well as a feeling of perceived collective victimization (Bar-Tal et al. 2009) that leads to the formations of a fragile and fearful collective ego that is backward instead of forward looking.

But change is both possible and there are changes happening in the direction of conflict transformation despite the dominance of the ideological apparatuses of education, church and mass media in the Greek Cypriot community as well as failures, political obstacles found in the political scene. The theoretical framework that can facilitate our understanding of both continuity and change in social representations is described in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5. The theoretical framework of Genetic Social Psychology

- **Social Representations-Ideological Level of Analysis**
- **Intergroup-Positional Level of Analysis**
- **Interpersonal Level of Analysis**
- **Intra-personal Level of Analysis**

Third Generation GC IDPs (Ontogenetic time)

Second Generation GC IDPs (Ontogenetic Time)

First Generation of GC IDPs (Ontogenetic Time)

|--------|------|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|
Table 2. Intragroup (Interpersonal) and Intergroup Relationships and their relationships to significant structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal Sphere/Part-Whole relations</th>
<th>World Views</th>
<th>Feelings towards outgroup</th>
<th>Intergroup Contact</th>
<th>Historical Consciousness</th>
<th>Social Psychological Correlates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations of Constraint (submission)</td>
<td>Threats- Dangerous World</td>
<td>Prejudice, Distrust, Lack of empathy</td>
<td>Low Contact</td>
<td>Traditional and Exemplary Historical Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strict Parenting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High RWA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of Constraint (domination)</td>
<td>World as a jungle- Competition</td>
<td>Prejudice, Distrust, Lack of empathy</td>
<td>Low Contact</td>
<td>Traditional and Exemplary Historical Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High SDO (would not be predictive for minority groups)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations of Cooperation (Secure attachment with parents, mutual respect)</td>
<td>Low threats More benevolent world view</td>
<td>Positive feelings, Trust, Empathy</td>
<td>High contact</td>
<td>Critical and Genetic Historical Consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low RWA, SDO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The triad of the subject-object-other depicted is the significant structure to be studied, it is the unit of analysis of genetic social psychology. The triad should be conceptualised as both an activity structure and a configuration of expectations about who should or is controlling the “object”. In the case of divided Cyprus for GCs the object is land and for TCs it is power sharing. Thus the triad is not in fact symmetrical but asymmetrical in terms of its expectations about subject, other, object and relations between the poles thereof. As children grow up in Cyprus, and given their narrow ethical horizons in early childhood it is only natural that they develop first mostly a Cypriotcentric identification in early childhood but without any sense of direction towards the other community; however, with more years in the educational system the hellocentric orientation in the case of GCs becomes stronger (see Appendix Table E in the Appendix).

The structure of the triad depends on both cognitive developmental and ideological constraints. From the cognitive developmental perspective, the triad in early childhood should be seen as undifferentiated. Subject and Object are Subject and Other are undifferentiated. The knowledge of the child is one constrained by the here and now and is driven by the figurative aspects of knowing. In Piagetian terms the “periphery” of subject-object interaction. Any “prejudice” in these years of early childhood (before 6-7 years old) should be seen as the result of having heard by significant others that other groups or countries “being like that” or in the case of GCs having grabbed something that belongs to us (for Turks) or treated us badly (for GCs) in the case of TCs or from visible cues of difference (gender, colour etc).

Children, however, have no understanding of part whole relations and this has consequences for the role of intergroup contact. Even if they have positive intergroup contact from their perspective generalisation of positive feelings from the individual to the whole group would not be possible. At this age binary distinctions of a figurative nature would work as organising principles (gender, skin colour etc) and would make difficult any differentiations within groups. Children in middle and late childhood develop their cognitive capacity to a great extent, subject-object-other relations become differentiated and the move from “periphery to centre” starts to take place. Children master part-whole relations and also begin to make internal differentiations between out-group members on the basis of individual or trait characteristics of persons. This stereotypical thinking can be reduced but its actual reduction depends on the prevailing norms and opportunities for intergroup contact whose importance increases in this period for prejudice reduction. In this period from 6-7
to 11-12 years old the role of social relations of constraint and co-operation is also important as the ethical horizon of childhood is largely exhausted in interpersonal relationships with significant others but links between the interpersonal and the intergroup sphere are also beginning to emerge with children that often find themselves in positions of submission (with both peers and adults) developing a sense of threatened identity that is also projected to feelings about outgroups. In this sense this is the period that we have the beginnings of the formation of a rudimentary consciousness of RWA and SDO (Cadamuro et al., 2021) which seems to suggest a transition that entails the broadening of horizon from the interpersonal to the intergroup in more reflective way. In this period we also have the emergence of resistance to unfair treatment as children become reflective of equality and inequality in their interpersonal relationships (Killen et al. 2018).

As suggested by Duveen & Lloyd (1990) an adequate account of ontogenesis needs to describe how social representations become psychologically active for individuals. This happens when by reconstructing social representations children are constructing social identities. In our analysis earlier we have seen that the social representation of Cyprus as the weak victim of conquerors supports two different identities. One which is the more Cypriot-centric one (it is the dominant one and also more prevalent in early childhood) but the other which is the more Helleno-centric one becoming stronger through the child’s career in the public school system but also inclusion in in-group social networks related to the church and right wing football fun clubs and enlistment to the military that promote helleno-centric ideals and strong interpersonal and intergroup hierarchies.

In late childhood and early adolescence contact with TCs or symbolic resources that talk about friendship between the two communities and intercultural education also starts to form the ethical horizon of students. Students start forming an identity as a Cypriot, but this time inclusive of TCs as well so they have lower levels of threats, more empathy and perspective taking and lower SDO and RWA, prejudice and distrust.

The direction of ontogenetic change is thus largely defined by microgenetic changes that take place in social interactions between both in-group significant others and outgroup members in the triad depicted in the Figure 5 above. The quality of these social interactions as a process and the content of what is being discussed in these social interactions both play a crucial role in the direction of ontogenetic transitions. The mediating role of in-group norms here becomes crucial since children
are also influenced by what they sense their significant in-group others think about the object. As social relations of constraint become weaker with age and developing agency and relations of co-operation become stronger social interactions with significant others or their views could lead to more stable changes serving a stabilizing identity function.

As we are reminded by Duveen (2001) social identities are a function of representations, and are concerned both with identifications and being identified, and they can be construed as positions within the symbolic field of a culture. Thus the 3 positions in 2007 and the 4 positions in 2017 that we have identified in our sociogenetic analysis earlier will offer the raw material of adult expectations of the “being identified” part for students in the micro genetic process of social interaction between parents-students and teachers-students. According to ESS-R9 in the GC community about 1/3 of adults feel close to a political party whilst most are not interested in politics nor feel competent in taking part in politics either. Thus a minority of students would be exposed to views more or less politically articulated (as I was from my father, see my autobiographical note) but the majority will be influenced by some of the grassroots understandings that we have seen earlier. Given the multiplicity of positions one could assume that students extract their sense of in-group norms by the stance of the majority of their teachers and the official policy and rituals of the school. Microgenetic processes of social influence and the development of agency will be regulated by the forms of recognition between subject and other with closer and deeper interpersonal relationships having a stronger influence on the consciousness of students in either direction although relations of constraint will be more likely connected with “superficial layer of beliefs” (Duveen, 2002) in Piagetian terms than reconstructed knowledge as depicted in Table 2 above. Children in late childhood and adolescence become agents in the field of ethnic identity in the sense that they also start choosing their friends by seeking or avoiding intergroup contact. This makes clear the dialectic between social representations and identities. As noted by Duveen (2001), Lucien Goldmann (1976) saw so penetratingly that the identities that emerge in the course of development constrain the representations which individuals or groups might accept. In his terms the limiting case was one where the conditions for the acceptance of a new representation entailed the dissolution of an existing identity.
Theoretical future of Genetic Social Psychology

There has been some theoretical engagement with Genetic Social Psychology beyond the positive commentaries by Moscovici (2013), Valsiner (2013) and Nicolopoulou and Weintraub (2007) mentioned earlier. The more recent one came from another scholar influenced in his work by both Piaget and Moscovici, Antonio Castorina in Buenos Aires. Castorina proposes a similar model to the one presented here that he calls Revised Genetic Psychology; however, he is sceptical of the merging of the disciplines of social and developmental psychology, not because of epistemological incompatibility, but out of respect for their own traditions, methodologies, theories and questions posed.

Castorina made his positive yet critical and constructive expositions in two papers. The first was a text written in Castorina (2010) as a tribute to Gerard Duveen short after his untimely death in Papers on Social Representations with the title The Ontogenesis of Social Representations: A Dialectic Perspective. The second, again in the online journal Papers on Social Representations is entitled Relationships between revisited genetic psychology and the theory of social representations: A critical analysis which was written in Castorina (2017).

In the first paper Castorina makes the following points that he seems to appreciate in Duveen’s work. He writes that “The leitmotif of Duveen’s work has been the process through which children assimilate the beliefs of their communities and thus acquire their social identity, which in turn enables them to become social actors.” Duveen according to Castorina a) elucidates the dialectical process of the development of representations, b) acknowledges Vygotsky’s contribution to the (Theory of Social Representations) TSR while questioning some aspects of his concept of culture, c) shows the correlative construction of subject and object in the dialectics of knowledge and, d) establishes the conditions for Social Representations to be accepted by developmental psychologists.

In this commentary Castorina wrote something that both we and Patrick Leman (2010) found objectionable in his rendering of Duveen’s work: he wrote about “the significance of some of his [Duveen’s] empirical studies which link psychological development to social identity” as describing a process of individuation in social psychology. As can be seen in this paper there is no place in Genetic Social Psychology for individuation (which I take here as meaning social representations forming a sense of individuality), and there are at least two reasons for this: a)
Duveen was describing the process of the ontogenesis of social representations as the emergence of the social actor and the internalisation of a social identity not a personal or ego identity; Duveen was interested in the social psychological and not the psychological subject.

Even in the original Genetic Psychology of Piaget the epistemic subject, the study of which was Piaget’s research interest, is not an individual subject but a mere abstraction dealing with the coordination of actions irrespective of whether these take place intra or interpersonally. Already in his PhD thesis (Duveen, 1984) on a discussion of the epistemic subject he makes clear that the epistemic subject is not an individual subject. Piaget used the example of two individuals building a bridge as an example of co-operation, and Duveen cited the example of two individuals moving a piano that Lucien Goldmann gave to discuss the trans-individual subject. But still what the epistemic subject was missing (given that it is an abstraction) according to Duveen was valorisation and resistance, which appears on the scene once we bring into play the subjects belonging in the social group where one shares in social representations about an object. This is why later on we suggested the idea of operativity in context (Psaltis, Duveen & Perret-Clermont, 2009) and I think we have demonstrated through the dynamics of social interaction in our own work with Duveen (Psaltis & Duveen, 2006;2007): the Fm dyad (a dyad where the female was a conserver interacting with a male that was a non-conserver) facilitates a conflict of asymmetries that brings about the space for the true construction of novelty. In that sense the social gender identity dynamics are co-constructed and do not characterise any individual property.

This brings us to the second criticism voiced by Castorina (2017) in the second paper in PSR. In this paper we see both points of agreement and disagreement between Castorina’s Revised Genetic Psychology and what was proposed here as Genetic Social Psychology. On the one hand we agree with Castorina that there is epistemological compatibility between Moscovici’s Social Representations Theory and Piaget’s Genetic Psychology which goes against the position of Ivana Markova (2010) who argued that the two approaches are epistemologically incompatible. Nevertheless, even within a social constructivist epistemology there is still an issue of how much similarity or difference one sees between the construction of scientific knowledge and the construction of understanding and representations of social objects like gender, ethnicity, a social problem etc for example.
Castorina makes too strong a distinction when he is stating that above all, SR are inherently evaluative and shaped through social discourse, not limited by the argumentative logic of concepts. Whilst this is true and Duveen would certainly accept that in the case of scientific knowledge we have the construction of what Leslie Smith (2013) called ‘necessary knowledge,’ a kind of knowledge that has a logical necessity absent in the case of representations discussed in this chapter. I feel Castorina is overstretching the differences between genetic psychology and social representations. On this point Duveen talks about relative autonomy and never fails to remind his readers that Moscovici was inspired by the notion of representations from his reading of Piaget’s *The child’s construction of the world*. We argued for the embedding of the epistemic subject in the social psychological subject which means that operative structures can still be found in SRs. SRs however will not be exhausted by them. For example, the binary distinction of gender or race relations in early childhood do appear to be regulated by cognitive developmental constraints of the pre-operational stage. But in older children we see that there is an interplay between the cognitive and the social that cannot be empirically disentangled, as for example when the part-whole relationships become a pre-requisite for the understanding of relations between Cypriots and the other community, Greece and Turkey that of course do not necessarily relate to positive or negative attitudes towards these groups.

Castorina claims that values cannot be organised in the logical sequence that could be given, precisely, by the structure of a research conducted within developmental psychology which is true. Still, in the ontogenesis of social representations that Duveen studied (Gender, Friendships, Economy) there was a clear developmental path that was largely defined by two orientations: the practical and the reflective directly related to the transition from the pre-operational to operational thinking. So in terms of content we do agree that there is no evaluative criterion to judge one value over another. However, in terms of structure there is a clear developmental course suggested by theorizing in Genetic Social Psychology.

Castorina in his 2017 paper in PSR also states the following: The claim that Genetic Social Psychology does not differ from developmental psychology, or that the latter always implies the former, is debatable. While introducing the SR can reformulate Genetic Psychology itself when studying children's social ideas, it is not acceptable to claim that "the operating Piagetian
structures, as Duveen states (1997) and following Moscovici (1989/2000) could actually be understood as social representations” (Psaltis and Zapiti, 2014, p.38).

On the first sentence I think that we never intended to make such a claim, especially when so many varieties of developmental psychology exist. But on the second point where Castorina rejects the point that "the operating Piagetian structures, could actually be understood as social representations" I feel that I need to defend the point made in Psaltis and Zapiti (2014).

I think here we see a reemergence of the individual-social antinomy that I discussed earlier on the issue of individuation under a different guise. In his “Psychological Development as a Social Process,” Duveen (1997) citing Guida de Abreau’s work on social representations of mathematics writes “we do not usually think of children’s internalization of representations of mathematics as being linked to specific social identities, but this can indeed be the case.” Then he goes on to give the work of Carugati’s (1989) on the study of social representations of intelligence as another example. In this way he wanted to show that valorization, the symbolic value of social representations and social stakes are inextricably interlinked with the development of operative structures. The process of “socially representing” is at play when children co-construct their operational structures. Above all Duveen’s favourite example was the work of Doise and Mugny (1984) on social interaction and cognitive development that offered for him the most convincing evidence in this direction.

This is the work that we extended in our work with Gerard Duveen in Cambridge and later expanded in the University of Cyprus with Anna Zapiti. This was the culmination of work “which condensed many years of experimental and ethnographic research in Geneva, Sussex and Cambridge on how the construction of the mental is not only permeated by social interaction but dependent on it” (Jovchelovitch & Wagoner, 2013, p. X).

Hopefully, the Genetic Social Psychology framework proposed here will facilitate theoretical expansions in various other disciplines and areas of interest in the future. In social developmental psychology it could help overcome the fragmentation of mini-models about developments in various domains. The Piagetian tradition can turn its attention into further refinements of the work of Piaget and Weil (1951) that was stopped short due to concerns by the public in the cold-war
climate of the times (Perret-Clermont, 2007, personal communication). Social Representations theory can attain a more critical edge, as it often ends up just being a descriptive enterprise failing to find a place for power and its critique in its theoretical model. The field of history didactics can also enlarge its understanding of historical consciousness through an articulation of the processes of microgenesis, ontogenesis and sociogenesis. Finally, the field of conflict transformation can obtain a better understanding of both opportunities and challenges in the process of reconciliation in post-conflict settings. At the same time further developments in these fields will naturally enlarge the purview of Genetic Social Psychology itself.

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APPENDIX I

FINDINGS FROM THE GREEK CYPRIO T COMMUNITY IN THE PERIOD 2007-2020

Figure A1.1. Prejudice levels of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots in the period 2007-2020

In 2015 there was a significant increase of GCs with positive feelings towards TCs (prejudice reduction). Then it was gradually reduced but in 2020 it has recovered up to levels comparable to 2015 with those having positive feelings being more than double those with negative feelings.
Figure A1.2. National Identification of Greek Cypriots in the period 2007-2020
Figure A1.3. Stance towards keeping the current situation (Status Quo) in the period 2010-2020

Just after Crans Montana a slight decrease of people who reject keeping the status quo was observed. However, from 2019 to 2020 an impressive increase of people who reject the status quo was observed. Today 79.4% of Greek Cypriots reject the continuation of the status quo.
In the last decade around 70% of Greek Cypriots support the Unitary State. After the Crans Montana failure there was a temporary decrease in the support of the Unitary State but in 2020 the trend is undone with 71.5% of Greek Cypriots supporting the Unitary state.

Figure A1.4. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Unitary State in the period 2010-2020
Stance towards two states 2010-2020 (Greek Cypriots)

% Against Two state solution in 2020

80%

In the last decade above 70% of Greek Cypriots reject a two state solution. After the Crans Montana failure there is an increasing rejection of the two state solution in the Greek Cypriot community.

Note: Data collection in 2017 was completed 3 months before Crans Montana (UCFS) and 5 months after Crans Montana (International Cooperation 5 Universities) 2019 data collection completed in first months of 2019 (ESS R9)
In 2020 it was completed in March 2020 (KENT-UCFS)

Figure A1.5. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Two States in the period 2010-2020
Figure A1.6. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF) in the period 2010-2020

In the last decade the percentage of people who reject BBF has been significantly reduced. On the contrary the people with a federalist mentality have more than doubled. The two bigger groups today are either the people who support BBF or could tolerate it as a solution of necessity. Together they form a majority of 76% according to more recent data available in 2020.

Note: Data collection in 2017 was completed 3 months before Crans Montana (UCFS) and 5 months after Crans Montana (International Cooperation 5 Universities). 2019 data collection completed in first months of 2019 (ESS R9). In 2020 it was completed in March 2020 (KENT-UCFS).
Figure A1.7. Stance of Greek Cypriots towards referendum scenario in the period 2013-2020

A significant rise in positive predisposition towards a YES vote in a possible referendum was registered since 2015 with the exception of January 2017 and December 2017. In the last 5 years the mean general tendency towards YES outvoted the tendency towards NO by 2:1.
APPENDIX II

FINDINGS FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN THE PERIOD 2007-2020
Figure AII.1. Prejudice levels of Turkish Cypriots towards Greek Cypriots in the period 2007-2020

Since 2007 there is a constant decrease in prejudice levels of TCs towards GCs. In the last 3 years those expressing positive feelings are about equal in numbers with those expressing negative views about GCs. In 2020 39% of TCs expressed positive feelings towards GCs.
Figure AII.2. National Identification of Turkish Cypriots in the period 2007-2020
Figure AII.3. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards keeping the current situation (Status Quo) in the period 2010-2020

Since 2010 there is an increasing trend of those you accept the continuation of the status quo. From 2019 to 2020 a further increase of people who accept the status quo was observed. Today 51.8% of Turkish Cypriots accept the continuation of the status quo.
Figure AII.4. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards Unitary State in the period 2010-2020

In the last two years those who are against a Unitary State amongst Turkish Cypriots is the bigger group. Immediately after Crans Montana a significant increase against a Unitary State was observed. In 2020 there was a significant decrease in the people who oppose it but it is still the bigger group with 47.2% being against.
Figure A1.5. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards Two States in the period 2010-2020

Note: Data collection in 2017 was completed 5 months after Crans Montana (International Cooperation 5 Universities) In 2020 it was completed in March 2020 (KENT-UCFS)

After the Crans Montana failure there is an increasing acceptance of the two state solution in the Turkish Cypriot community
In the last decade the people in favor of BBF have significantly increased in number. On the contrary there is a significant decrease in the people who would tolerate it if necessary. After Crans Montana failure there is a significant decrease in the supporters of BBF. Those who would either support it or tolerate it if necessary however in 2020 still add up to 71.2%.
Figure A1.7. Stance of Turkish Cypriots towards referendum scenario in the period 2013-2020

In the last 10 years there seems to be more voters supporting a NO vote than YES vote. In the last year there is increasing polarization. In the last 10 years the mean general tendency towards NO outvoted the tendency towards YES by 2:1.
Table A. Means and Standard Deviations of scales and questions for the Greek Cypriot community by Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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They should receive amnesty (no punishment) if that brings lasting peace

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<tr>
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They should beg for forgiveness to their victims and victims’ families

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<th>55+</th>
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They should have a fair trial and if found guilty they should be harshly punished

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War criminals should pay financial compensation to their victims

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The Turkish state should pay financial compensation to victims

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They should testify to a truth and reconciliation commission and as an exchange they shouldn’t be prosecuted

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<tr>
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Contact with Turkish Cypriots on social media (eg. facebook)

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<tbody>
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<td>Question</td>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Do you think most Turkish Cypriots would try to take advantage of you</td>
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<td>if they had the chance or would they try to be fair?</td>
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<td>Identification (Cypriocentric orientation)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55+</td>
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<td>Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals, baptisms, etc.</td>
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<td>how often do you go to church?</td>
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Table B. Means and Standard Deviations of scales and questions for the Turkish Cypriot community by Age Group

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Table C. National Identification of Greek Cypriots 18 years old+ 2007-2020

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Table E. National Identification of Greek Cypriot Students 7-17 from Kyriakides (2020) PhD thesis

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